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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL

Section I.

•

•

INTRODU~TION

1-1. Purpose
a. This manual sets forth doctrine and establishes procedures for the management,
planning, and collection of information which,
upon evaluation and production into intelligence, is reported and disseminated as Army
technical intelligence. It provides guidance for
commanders, staff officers, and other personnel
and units and aids in understanding the concept and role of technical intelligence in the
overall intelligence requirements of the commander.
b. Users of this manual are encouraged to
submit recommendations to improve its clarity
or accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the
specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in
which the change is recommended. Reasons
should be provided for each comment to insure
understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort
Holabird, Maryland 21219. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine
may send an information copy, through command channels, to the Commanding General,
USACDC, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and follow-up.
1-2. Scope
a. The contents of this manual deal primarily with technical intelligence organizations
and the objectives and functions of technical
intelligence operations. The manual outlines
procedures and establishes broad principles regarding the role of military intelligence units
engaged in technical intelligence activities, and
identifies those sources and agencies available
AGO 6S69A

to assist in accomplishing the technical intelligence requirements of the commander. Engineer topographic and terrain intelligence are
discussed in FM 5-30 and 30-10; they are not
included within the scope of this manual.
-

b. The material presented herein is applica-

ble to general war, limited war, and cold war
situations, to include stability operations; nuclear and nonnuclear warfare environments;
and employment of, and protection from,
chemical, biological, and radiological agents.

c. This manual is in consonance with the following International Standardization Agreements which are identified by type of agreement
and number at the beginning of each appropriate chapter in the manual: ST AN AG 2084,
and SOLOG 94 (Handling and Reporting of
Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment);
STANAG 2097 (Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc
Army Weapons and Equipment).
1-3. Definitions
a. For definition of terms used see AR
320-5.
b. The relationship of intelligence and technical intelligence is set forth below:
(1) Intelligence is the product resulting
from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all information
concerning one or more aspects of foreign
countries or areas which are immediately or
potentially significant to the development and
execution of military plans, policies, operations
and development of military equipment. Technical intelligence, which is one aspect of military intelligence, plays a vital role in the tactical and strategic intelligence picture and therefore must be considered as part of an overall
1-1
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integrated intelligence effort. All tactical commanders and staff officers should employ technical intelligence in planning and maintaining
the security of their commands.
(2) Technical intelligence is that intelligence concerning foreign technological developments and the performance and operational
capabilities of foreign materiel, which now or
may eventually have a practical application for
military purposes. As with all other intelligence, it is the end product resulting from the
collection and processing of technical information. The scope of technical intelligence is
broad. It includes all technical aspects of foreign equipment, supplies, installations, facilities, communications, and captured or abandoned items which have a practical application
in furthering military operations. The scope
also includes captured friendly and allied
equipment and materiel which may have been
in the hands of a hostile force. Technical intelligence, then, contributes primarily to the extension of the combat intelligence effort. (See
appendix B for categories of technical intelligence.)

1-4.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence

a. Scientific and Technical (S&T) Intelligence includes that foreign intelligence relating

Section II.
1-5.

b. Within the Department of the Army, the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
( ACSI) has general staff responsibility for all
matters pertaining to intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The organizational element within ACSI which exercises general
staff supervision over S&T intelligence activities of the Army is the Scientific and Technical
Division, Directorate of Foreign Intelligence.
This division monitors intelligence produced
and the intelligence activities involved in this
production to determine that weapons and
equipment, scientific, nuclear, chemical, missile, space, and electronic requirements levied
on DA production facilities are fulfilled. This
division also provides DA representation on
scientific and technical committees and working groups of the U.S. Intelligence Board
(USIB).

•

•

THE STRATEGIC EFFORT

Introduction
a. The objectives of strategic technical intelligence are to(1) Determine capabilities, limitations,
and vulnerabilities of foreign technology, materiel, facilities, and installations.
(2) Exploit foreign technologies for the
benefit of U.S. Forces.
(3) Assist in the development of effective countermeasures by providing intelligence
to the overall military research and development effort.
(4) Provide materiel and information
upon which to base the training of all armed
forces personnel.
b. The overall military technical intelligence
program is vital to the U.S. strategic/national,
scientific, and technical intelligence effort. The
1-2

to basic and applied research in natural and
applied sciences and in applied engineering
techniques. Also included are the scientific and
technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapons systems, and other materiel;
production methods employed in their manufacture; and related technology pertaining to
materiel operation, and logistic support.

technical intelligence organization of the Department of Defense (DOD) includes elements
of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and
the three services or military departments:
Department of the Army, Department of the
Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

1--6. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
a. DIA coordinates the intelligence activities
of the three military departments and satisfies
the intelligence requirements of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and DOD. In the area of technical intelligence, DIA is responsible for the
overall management and review of all technical
intelligence activities throughout DOD.
b. The action element of DIA for its technical intelligence responsibility is the Directorate
of Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Direct
AGO 6869A
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communication or coordination is authorized
between this directorate and the external
technical intelligence agencies on nonpolicy
matters relating to the production of S&T intelligence. The principal producers of technical
intelligence within DOD are(1) Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence of DIA (DIAST).
(2) Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC).
(3) Missile
Intelligence
Directorate
(MID) of the Army Missile Command of
USAMC.
( 4) Medical Intelligence Office of the
Office of the Surgeon General of the Army.
( 5) Scientific and Technical Intelligence
Center (STIC) of the Department of the Navy.
(6) Foreign Technology Division (FTD)
of the Department of Air Force.

1-7. Strategic Role of DA Agencies
a. ACSI, DA, with general staff responsibil-

•

•

ity for all S&T intelligence activities in the
Army, performs the following functions:
(1) Formulates policies and procedures
which insure that S&T intelligence activities
of the Army are carrried out in the most
efficient and,productive manner.
(2) Supervises the preparation and execution of the Army S&T intelligence program, in
coordination with DIA, and provides for its integration into the DOD Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP).
(3) Coordinates requirements for technical intelligence originated by the DA staff and
major subordinate commands to insure that
they are fulfilled.
b. The U.S. Army Materiel Command
(USAMC) is responsible for commanding, operating, and managing two major CONUSbased Army S&T production agencies: the
Foreign Science and Technology Center
(FSTC) and the USAMC Missile Intelligence
Directorate of the Missile Command. USAMC,
through its subordinate agencies, is responsible
for providing U.S. strategic planners, the military research and development effort, and the
military S&T effort with timely and appropriate technical intelligence with the exception
of medical S&T intelligence .
AGO 6869A

c. The Surgeon General of the Army is responsible for commanding, operating, and managing the Medical S&T Branch which is part
of the Medical Intelligence Office.
d. The Chief of Engineers has DA staff responsibility to provide program guidance to
Army component commands on requirements
for military geographic intelligence, as outlined i~ FM 5-30. Within the Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army Topographic Command
(USATOPOCOM) is the primary element that
deals with national level, strategic intelligence.
e. The U.S. Army Security Agency
(USASA) is responsible for the exploitation of
cryptologic and other materiel in support of its
assigned mission areas as outlined in AR
10-122 and FM 32-10.
f. Oversea commands are responsible for collecting and producing S&T intelligence within
their capabilities and in accordance with validated DIA requirements, and for exploiting
and evacuating materiel to CONUS as appropriate. Reference AR 755-26 and AR 381-9.

1-8. S·trategic Procedures
a. A requirement for technical intelligence
may be originated by any agency or consumer
within the Army. Frequently, however, a research and development (R&D) activity or
major CONUS command may originate this requirement upon military intelligence resources.
b. Requirements are prepared using DD
Form 1497 for intelligence production requirements (IPR) and forwarded to DIA. Within
DA, requirements, as reviewed and approved
by ACSI, are forwarded to DIA for validation
and tasking. The DIA tasking procedure recognizes the need for direct departmental support
in order to enable the production agencies to
provide support to DA and intermediate headquarters for quick reaction needs, briefings,
and special purpose documents. Direct support
tasks in response to such requirements may be
levied by the ACSI, DA, on the FSTC, the Missile Intelligence Directorate, or the Medical Intelligence Office. The CG, USAMC may levy direct support requirements on FSTC and the
Missile Intelligence Directorate. The Surgeon
General may levy direct support requirements
on the Medical Intelligence Office. The Army
organization for strategic technical intelli1-3
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Figure 1-1. Army organization for strategic tecknical intelligence.
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gence is shown in figure 1-1. As requirements
are satisfied, the information and/or materiel
are forwarded direct, or through major overseas command channels, to CONUS. Unless
specific instructions to the contrary are given
by a DA agency, all items for CONUS exploitation will be forwarded to the Commanding
General, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, ATTN: STEAP-FI, Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland 21005, in accordance with
provisions of the theater command. After foreign materiel has been received at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, the decision as to the site of
actual exploitation of medical materiel is determined by the Surgeon General or his designated agent. A detailed exploitation plan will
be furnished ACSI by the agency designated to
perform the exploitation.
c. The major DA S&T intelligence production effort in CONUS is located at FSTC, Missile Intelligence Directorate, and the Medical
Intelligence Office. To consolidate the efforts of

these organizations, DIA has established a system which standardizes S&T intelligence management and production procedures for the
overall DOD S&T intelligence production effort,
and has assigned certain responsibilities for
production within DIA and to the military departments.
d. Final technical intelligence reports are
disseminated to various consumers in accordance with previously submitted statements of
intelligence interest (Sii). A continual feedback of information from oversea producers to
DIA and from DIA and CONUS-producing
units to the oversea major commands is essential to the effectiveness of the entire technical
intelligence program. The distribution of technical information from CONUS-producing
units is made by DIA to the oversea command
to insure that military intelligence units are
kept abreast of important foreign technical
and scientific trends and developments.

•

•
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CHAPTER 2
ARMY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
.•

Section I.
I'

"·

INTRODUCTION

2-1. General

•

The United States must strive to maintain a position superior to all enemies and potential enemies in any given area of technology and be
alert to the future technological developments
of all nations. In order to obtain this position
the objectives of technical intelligence are to:
a. Determine foreign technical materiel
threats as they affect strategic and tactical
planners and commanders.
b. Determine foreign technological capabilities and limitations.
c. Provide information from which military
countermeasures are developed .
d. Provide information which will enable
U.S. Forces to use foreign materiel and facilities.
e. Exploit new developments for U.S. military needs.
f. Obtain and exploit items in the DIA Registry, Foreign Materiel Requirements Listing
(FMRL).
g. Provide input on a continuous basis to the
overall national integrated S&T intelligence
program in consonance with theater policies.
h. Provide the technical intelligence aspects
f~:ir tactical and strategic studies on characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of foreign
facilities, equipment, installations, materiel,
and resources.
i. Determine efficiency of friendly munitions
and ordnance.

2-2. Mission of Tactical Technical Intelli-

•

gence Units
a. The mission of Army tactical technical intelligence units is to provide assistance to tactical commanders through the selective examination, evaluation, and classification of technical
AGO 6869A

information derived from exploitation of foreign equipment, materiel and facilities, and
provide assistance in establishing security
measures to prevent foreign examination of
U.S. equipment and information.
b. Tactical Technical intelligence units/personnel at all levels perform a twofold mission:
(1) They advise and assist the commander and staff in meeting tactical planning
needs in technical areas.
(2) They assist the strategic S&T intelligence effort by supporting theater DA and
DOD agencies in the overall integrated technical intelligence collection and analysis effort.
(3) They assist with training of units in
collection procedures.
(4) They advise units of current technical
intelligence requirements.
c. U.S. Army tactical technical intelligence
units are provided primarily to support the
field army commander's technical intelligence
requirements. These military technical intelligence units provide on the spot field analysis,
detailed analysis, and limited operational data
from field testing. These units are often in a
position to make recommendations for exploitation and/or countermeasures. Detailed analysis and evaluation are performed ·by the technical intelligence company of the field army
and/or higher echelons. Final and detailed
technical analysis beyond field army and/or
theater resources is performed in the appropriate CONUS producing unit.
d. Technical intelligence elements at all
echelons operate as functionally integrated
teams to insure maximum coordination, collation, and exploitation of foreign arms, equipment, and materiel.
e. Prompt exploitation at the lower echelons

2-1
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provides usable tactical intelligence, assists in
the production of strategic technical intelligence, facilitates military training, and assists
the overall national research and development
effort.

f. In unified or specified commands, the factors of distance and processing time from the
zone of interior may make it desirable for the
commander's intelligence organizations to perform certain functions normally associated
with CONUS units. In such cases the unified or
specified commander advises the higher echelon concerned of the functions being performed. He also insures that his action does
not interrupt the flow of information to the
higher echelon. Included among these functions may be:
(1) Publication of technical intelligence
bulletins.
(2) Publication of intelligence of a general orientation nature.
(3) Preparation and dissemination of
other intelligence studies and documents which
would lose utility if delayed by preparation in
the zone of interior.
Section II.
2-4.

•

•

FIELD ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGEN·CE

Feild Army Echelon
a. General. The collection of technical information and the production and dissemination of
technical intelligence in the field army area of
operations require extensive activity coordination, and continuity of effort. The field army
G2 is responsible for the direction and staff supervision of the entire technical intelligence effort within the field army. He is assisted by
technical intelligence staff personnel organic to
the field army headquarters which is augmented by a technical intelligence coordinator
and other technical intelligence personnel from
the army headquarters support section of the
Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army.
These personnel normally constitute a technical intelligence division or branch within the
field army G2 section. Staff policy, guidance,
2-2

2-3. T·heater Organization for Technical Intelligence
a. The technical intelligence organizational
concept for theater army is based upon theater
requirements and the assigned technical intelligence mission. Requirements are generated
by the technical intelligence needs of the command and its subordinate elements. The technical intelligence mission and guidance for its accomplishment will normally be provided to the
theater army commander by the theater commander. Specific tasking as a result of DIA
validated production requirements will follow
this same channel.
b. The theater army G2 will develop a functional organization for his G2 division which
reflects the usual theater army mission of coordination and supervision of operational, administrative, and territorial responsibilities. Normally, the special intelligence branch of the G2
division includes a S&T section which assists
the G2 in fulfilling his technical intelligence
responsibilities. Upon receipt of collection
directives and other technical intelligence requirements, the theater army G2 publishes specific directives which are sent through intelligence and technical channels to collection agencies.

requirements, and directives pertaining to
technical intelligence collection and production
are formulated by the technical intelligence
staff element of the field army G2 section and
forwarded through MI channels for execution
by the technical intelligence company.
b. Technical Intelligence Company. The
technical intelligence company operates under
the direct control of the Military Intelligence
Battalion, Field Army (TOE 30-25E). Figure
2-1 shows the organization of this military intelligence battalion. The Technical Intelligence
Company (TOE 30-34G) provides for the functionalized execution of the technical intelligence mission, exclusive of collection, within the
field army. Figure 2-2 shows the organization
of the technical intelligence company. This
grouping in one company of various technical
AGO 6869A
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skills provides a capability for a coordinated
technical intelligence effort; an interchange of
skills, knowledge, and experience; and a consolidation of specialized technical skills to insure the varied functional technical intelligence support necessary for the field army. This
unit is normally located in the vicinity of the
headquarters of the Field Army Support Command (F ASCOM). For a detailed discussion of
the technical intelligence company see FM
30-9.

2-5. Corps Echelon
The duties and functions of the corps G2 technical intelligence section are similar to those of
the technical intelligence division or branch of
the G2, field army (para 2-4a). To augment
the organic technical intelligence coordinator
of the corps G2 section, a technical intelligence

coordinator and other technical intellil!'ence
personnel are provided by the attached military intelligence detachment supporting the
corps (TOE 30-18). These are staff coordinating personnel and normally are not employed
in as operational role.

2-6. Augmentation
Cellular functional technical intelligence teams
from TOE 30-600 may provide augmentation
to the military intelligence organization supporting field army, corps, and division a3 required. These augmentation teams are organized based on seven collection areas : quartermaster, signal, chemical, transportation, medical, engineer, and ordnance. AR 310-10 describes the procedures for obtaining authorization for these augmentation teams.

•

•
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CHAPTER 3
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONALIZATION

Section I.

3-1. Overall Concept

•

•

The five functional areas of technical intelligence activities are communication-electronic
intelligence, weapons and munitions intelligence, general supply and equipment (to include
maintenance) intelligence, mobility intelligence, and medical intell~gence. The proper organization and employment of the technical intelligence specialists in support of these functional areas is critical to mission accomplishment. When employed as functional teams,
technical analysis and evaluation is accomplished more effectively. Personnel must not be
given analysis tasks which can be more
Section II.

GENERAL
efficiently performed by other field army or
theater assets. Each functionally organized
technical intelligence team must be tailored to
perform the required mission. Teams must be
flexible in their operations since personnel will
be required to perform extensive coordination
and liaison internally for mission success.
Teams should be "tailored" to perform a specific technical intelligence function with consideration given to the training and capabilities of the tElchnical specialists. The functionalized areas of interest of technical specialists
will frequently overlap. When possible, functional teams should be composed of personnel
having related functional qualifications.

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE

b. In meeting the above objectives, there is a
Objectives
continuous
need to examine, analyze, and test
-a. The primary objectives of communicacommunications-electronic
equipment and detions-electronics intelligence are to:
and
to
analyze
foreign
communications
vices
(1) Provide
communication-electronics ·
equipment
diagrams,
and
schematics.
Recent
equipment intelligence concerning the capabilicommunication
trends
and
developments
necesties and limitations of foreign communication
sitate
that
the
scope
of
communication-elecsystems, both civilian and military.
tronic equipment intelligence be broadened to
(2) Provide the field army with intelliinclude
wire, radio, teletypewriter, television,
gence on foreign communications equipment
satellites,
telemetering devices, electronic i-nand systems.
-struments,
photography, computers, radar, fac(3) Provide -data for possible application
simile,
and
laser communication equipment or
in developing new U.S. electronic equipment
devices.
and devices.
(4) Provide
communications-electronic
c. Communications-electronics
specialists
equipment intelligence for strategic and tactimaintain extensive liaison with other intellical planning.
gence elements, particularly those of the U.S.
(5) Assist in providing tactical and straArmy Security Agency (US ASA). USASA is
tegic estimates on enemy communication capatasked with the mission and responsibility of
bilities _to include the complete order of battle
exploiting, on a timely basis, all known or susof enemy units operating in a specified area of
pected sources possessing possible target exoperation.
ploitation (TAREX) or other information of

3-2.
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USASA interest as outlined in FM 32-10 ancl
AR 10-122.
d. In order to properly evaluate and interpret information concerning foreign communications-electronics research and development,
and to keep abreast of civilian and industrial
communications projects, a technical library
must be established. It should contain communication and electronics information concerning
details and performance data on a wide variety
of items.
e. Data in the following areas are of primary interest to communications-electronics
equipment intelligence production:
( 1) Radio equirnnenit.
(a) Output Power.
( b) Frequency Range.
( c) Bandwidth.
(d) Modes of Operation.
( e) Circuitry design.
(f) Antennas design.
(g) Antijamming devices.
(h) Tube structure.
( i) Transistors.
(j) Equipment ruggedness.
(k) Major modifications.
(l) Modules.
( m) Power requirements.
(2) Telephone equirnnent.
(a) Types of operation.
( b) Power requirements.
(c) Working limits.
( d) Type signal.
(3). Switchboards.
(a) Line capacity.
( b) Protection.
( c) Power requirements.
( d) Cord circuits.
(e) Types of operations.
( 4) Teletype equipmenit.
(a) Method of transmission and receiving.
( b) Type of signal.
(c) Speed.
( d) Power requirements.
( e) Line current.
(f) Signaling code.
(5) Facsimile.
(a) Maximum size of copy.
( b) Type of recording.
3-2

( c) Drum speed.
(d) Scanning lines.

(e) Audio carrier frequency.
(f) Type modulation.
(g) Bandwidth.
(h) Power requirements.
( 6) Carrier equirnnent.
(a) Channel capacity.
( b) Bandwidth.
(c) Line side operation.
( d) Loop side operation.
( e) Transmission media.
(/) System range.
(g) Operating levels.
(h) Signaling frequency.
( i) Type modulation.
(j) Power requirements.
/. Other general areas of interest to communications-electronics equipment intelligence
are(1) Acoustic equipment.
(2) Missile guidance devices.
(3) Power equipment.
(4) Meteorological equipment.
(5) Electronic countermeasures equipment.
( 6) Guided missile control systems.
(7) VT fuse information.

•

•

3-3. Capabilities of. Communications-Electronics Specialis-ts
a. Communications-electronics
specialists
are capable of :
(1) Exploiting intelligence from foreign
communications materiel.
(2) Assisting in the exploitation· of foreign scientific communications-electronics information.
(3) Evaluating enemy communicationselectronics equipment information as received
on a day-to-day basis.
(4) Supervising the collection and evacuation of enemy communications-electronics
equipment.
(5) Coordinating with and providing limited assistance, as may be required, to other intelligence activities such as USASA and strategic intelligence elements.
(6) Maintaining, evaluating, and interAGO 6869A
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preting information concerning military and
civilian research and development.
(7) Assisting in the exploitation of foreign communications complexes and facilities
by U.S. Forces. This may require communications-electronics personnel to accompany combat elements whose missions include the capture of communications bases or targets for
prompt analysis and exploitation.
(8) Coordinating with and conducting periodic briefings to division and higher command headquarters informing them of the
equipment being employed by the foreign units
within their area of operation or adjacent
areas and the known capabilities and limitation of all enemy communications and electronics units.
(9) Interrogate all enemy captives or returnees who possess information concerning

Section Ill.

•

WEAPONS AND MUN-ITIONS INTELLIGENCE

3-4. Objectives
The objective of weapons and munitions intelligence is to provide technical intelligence evaluation and analysis of:
a. Free rockets, guided missiles, and associated equipment including guidance and
launching equipment.
b. Foreign weapons and combat vehicles to
include tanks, towed and self propelled guns,
howitzers, and armored personnel carriers.
c. Nuclear and nonnuclear ammunition, to
include rocket and warhead sections.
d. Chemical, biological, and radiological
weapons and muntions, to include smoke and
flame weapons and munitions.
e. Propellants, explosives, and pyrotechnics,
to include mines.
f. Demolition techniques, barriers material,
mine field layouts.
3-5. Capabilities
Weapons and munitions specialists have the
capabilities to:

•
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enemy or foreign communications and electronics equipment or the manner in which it is deployed.
(10) Process all captured documents dealing with communications and electronics
equipment to obtain immediate combat technical intelligence as well as detailed technical
data.
b. Signal personnel, in addition to their normal technical intelligence capabilities, are capable of:
(1) Providing recommendations on the
disposition of fixed and special communications
installations and/ or equipment.
(2) Providing limited analysis concerning
radiac equipment and meters as well as electronic components of chemical and/or biological detection and warning devices and instruments.

a. Provide technical guidance to corps technical intelligence collection teams and to evaluate the .technical information received from
them.
b. Inspect foreign vehicles and weapons to
determine modifications and changes.

c. Identify, examine, and submit reports on
tactical capabilities of foreign weapons and
munitions.
d. Assist in the breakdown and assembly of
equipment and in the testing of vehicles, equipment, and accessories.

e. Assist in analysis of parts, assemblies, engines, power trains, and chassis for collation,
updating, and incorporation of data in technical manuals and handbooks.
f. Assist in the production of technical intelligence from factory markings.
g. Assist in the identification and evaluation
of flamethrowers, smoke generators, and other
chemical weapons and munitions.

FM 30-16

Section IV

GENERAL SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE

3-6. Obiectives
a. The primary objectives of general supply
and equipment intelligence are to:
(1) Provide general supply and equipment
intelligence on enemy supplies and resources.
Specific areas of interest are subsistence, individual clothing and equipment, general supplies, petroleum, maintenance, and services
such as graves registration, laundry, and bath.
(2) Provide the field army with such supply and equipment intelligence, based on immediate exploitation of materiel and information
acquired, as may be significant or contributing
to the immediate tactical mission.
(3) Provide materiel and information for
exploitation at theater army or CONUS level.
b. Technical intelligence analysis of enemy
combat service support, supply and equipment
must include consideration of enemy economic
factors (e.g., food, agriculture, and industrial
production), the enemy labor force, and enemy
technological capabilities. In this regard, close
coordination between technical intelligence and
strategic intelligence elements at field army is
imperative. Since analysis of enemy economic
factors are parts of civil affairs operations,
changes in their fields are missions normally
assigned to civil affairs units and staff elements.

c. Examination of captured items must be
continuous and must include consideration of
the applied sciences which made development
of the items possible. Increase, decrease, or
change in a nation's supplies gives indication
of a change in that country's combat service
support capabilities. All analyses must be
made with consideration of the social and cultural environment of the country concerned.
3-7. Capabilities of Supply, Equipment, and
Maintenance Specialists
a. Supply, equipment, and maintenance specialists have the following capabilities:
( 1) Determining the design, performance,
source, and methods of manufacture, and
methods of storing times.
(2) Examining supply and maintenance
3-4

organizations, installations, and storage depots.
(3) Determining characteristics, limitations, vulnerabilities, and military potential of
military and civilian facilities.
(4) Processing and abstracting information from foreign commodities and equipment
acquired in a field army area of responsibility.
( 5) Preparing technical intelligence reports and studies concerning such items as petroleum, food, clothing, and equipment.
(6) Assisting in the training of field army
personnel in supply and equipmePt intelligence.
(7) Producing and maintaining information and intelligence concerning foreign materiel and commodities.
(8) Assisting in the analysis of foreign
storage, packing, and preparation of food and
equipment.
b. Supply and equipment technical intelligence specialists include highly trained chemical personnel for operating the CBR agent
sampling and analyzing kit. Chemical personnel evaluate chemical defense equipment, including individual and collective protection
equipment, to include protective clothing and
decontamination equipment and supplies.
c. In conjunction with other technical intelligence specialists, supply and equipment specialists provide a capability to the field army for
supervising battlefield collection of a wide variety of items. For example, through the use of
mobile laboratories available at theater level,
the analysis, evaluation, and identification of
captured foreign petroleum products and facilities for U.S. tactical uses are facilitated.
d. Other areas of technical intelligence to
which supply and equipment specialists can
contribute are analysis of :
(1) Troop subsistence supplies.
(2) Commodity items.
(3) Food spoilage and contamination.
(4) Packaging and marking.
(5) Data concerning draft animals.
( 6) Individual and collective protection
equipment, protective clothing, and decontamination.
e. Supply and equipment technical intelliAGO 6869A
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gence personnel may assist order of battle sections by identification of enemy uniforms, in-

Section V.

MOBILITY INTELLIGENCE

3-8. Objectives
The objectives of mobility technical intelligence cover most aspects of engineer and transportation activity at all echelons of the foreign
military organizations. Engineer and transportation support has become increasingly more
important in all types of military operations.
Mobility technical 'intelligence specialists will
usually be involved in both strategic and tactical technical intelligence. (See FM 30-5 for
the interrelationship of combat and strategic
intelligence.) The field army technical intelligence company will have to meet the needs of
the theater and lower levels. Frequently, the
same items of mobility intelligence may be
needed by various levels within the field army
and the theater. Mobility technical intelligence
will play an important part in the overall strategic and tactical planning for field army and
theater forces.
3-9. Capabilities
a. TransportatiOn mobility specialists contribute to the production of technical intelligence concerning foreign air, land, and water
transportation equipment of immediate or potential military importance. This intelligence
concerns characteristics, conditions, development, organization, materiel, operation, maintenance, construction, performance, capabilities, and limiting factors of foreign transportation equipment and supplies. Mobility technical
intelligence is necessary for contingency planning and em~rgency operations. Transportation specialists will need to produce intelligence on adjacent friendly countries for use by
technical and strategic planners and combat
service support elements since U.S. Forces may
often use another nations's transportation system.
b. Mobility specialists can contribute to the
following:
(1) Integration and coordination of the
transportation collection effort, to include estiAGO 6869A

signia, and decorations, and by maintaining
supply and equipment files.

mates of capabilities of transportation facilities and systems.
(.2) Evaluation, interpretation, processing,
and dissemination of transportation information and data to include estimates of capabilities of transportation facilities and systems.
(3) Assistance in the preparation of
transportation estimates.
( 4) Assistance in the interrogation of civilian and military personnel having transportation intelligence information.
(5) Assistance in strategic transportation
planning.
(6) Evaluation of new transportation
modes, systems, and related equipment.
(7) Assistance in determining an estimate
of foreign capabilities to transport missiles
and nuclear weapons.
(8) Evaluation of economic and technical
aspects of foreign transportation systems .
(9) Compilation of data on foreign ~rans
portation modes, systems, facilities, and equipment.

c. Engineer mobility specialists contribute to
limited analyses and evaluation of technical intelligence concerning the following :
(1) Foreign engineer equipment to include
its capabilities.
(2) Foreign construction operations, techniques, and resources.
(3) Materiel quality and shortages.
(4) Foreign depots, dumps, and supply
points.
(5) Water-crossing equipment and techniques.
(6) Demolition techniques, barrier materials, and mine field layouts.
(7) A bibliography of foreign military
and civilian engineer specialists and engineer
order of battle.
(8) Studies to evaluate the destructive capability of nuclear weapons.
3-5
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Section VI.

MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE

3-10. Objectives
a. Medical intelligence is that category of intelligence which concerns itself with man as a
living organism and those factors which affect
his efficiency, capability, and well-being. Although medical intelligence is a functional entity and should not be fragmented, strategic requirements indicate the need for intelligence
concerning the relatively broad areas of foreign medical technical developments, performance, and operational capabilities.
b. Medical technical intelligence is not primarily materiel oriented. Examination, evaluation, and classification of medical materiel are
only segments of the total medical technical intelligence effort. Medical intelligence must retain integrity so that the end product will include all available information, immediately or
potentially significant, which affects the health
and welfare of men and animals in actual or
potential areas of military operation. Such information is vital in both strategic and tactical
planning and may influence military operations.
c. The theater command can provide valuable assistance and guidance for the field army
medical technical intelligence effort. The theater surgeon can coordinate the employment of
medical units in support of medical intelligence
activities and arrange for support of field army
medical intelligence activities by theater level
units as appropriate. The theater surgeon and
his staff can assist 'the field army G2 in determining potential tactical and strategic implications of fully evaluated medical intelligence
produced by field army technical intelligence
elements.
d. The field army surgeon can assist in providing requirements for medical information/
intelligence to the command G2. The intelligence produced may be coordinated and evaluated by the field army surgeon and staff as
necessary.
3-11. Capabilities
a. Medical specialists are capable of performing the following specific technical intelligence functions:

( 1) Collect, examine, classify, and evaluate raw information concerning non-U.S.
health problems, training, and materiel used
by foreign medical services.
(2) Provide medical intelligence information to the field army surgeon through G2 for
professional evaluation prior to dissemination.
(3) Assist in the interrogation of selected
prisoners of war, refugees, defectors, and escapees to obtain medical information.
( 4) Assist in the investigation of medical
aspects of incidents involving diseases or
enemy CBR operations.
(5) Accomplish initial examination and
evacuation of captured foreign medical materiel to include escort of live cultures to CONUS.
( 6) Assist in the compilation of environmental data pertinent to health aspects of military operations.
(7) Provide technical staff advice on medical intelligence to include the scope of medical
subjects to be incorporated into medical unit
training programs.
(8) Provide limited analysis of drugs, serums, and antibiotics.
b. Medical information of potential technical
intelligence value is primarily obtained by:
( 1) Direct observation of patients and
medical service operations, both military and
civilian.
(2) Discussions with personnel involved
directly or indirectly with medical service operations (enemy, allied, or civilian).
(3) Study of military and civilian reports
and publications of a medical or technical nature.
( 4) Interrogation or interview of prisoners of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, and friendly escapees.
( 5) Examination of foreign medical materiel, facilities, and personnel protective devices.
(6) Coordination with Civil Affairs public
health teams who obtain information on the
public health services and facilities in an area
of operation.
(7) Review of foreign individual medical
records, statistics, and health reports to assist
AGO 6869A
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in further evaluation of the efficiency of
friendly materiel used.
(8) Evaluating
foreign
capabilities
through reviewing and interpreting individual
immunization records and contemplated or existing preventive medicine programs. (Prophylactic immunizations, drugs, protective drugs,
clothing, and insect repellents.)
c. In addition to the above medical technical
intelligence personnel are able to(1) Assist in the identification of CBR
agents.
(2) Assist in the evaluation of CBR
weapons.
( 3) Provide information and data on medical aspects of enemy combat operations.
( 4) Assist, as required, in the preparation
of medical studies and reports of tactical significance.
(5) Collect data regarding foreign military and civilian medical facilities.
(6) Provide advice on communicable diseases.
d. Special Warfare Capabilities·:
( 1) Medical intelligence contributes significantly to the planning, preparation, and execution of activities related to unconventional
warfare, stability operations, and psychological operations by :
(a) Providing information on the best
approach to foreign and primitive cultures.
( b) Recommending the adoption of
techniques to reduce interpersonal stress developing in small isolated detachments working in
a foreign culture.
(c) Advising the planning staff on the
medical evaluation of ethnic groups in operational areas or potential areas of commitment
concerning those factors which affect their ef- ·
ficiency, capability, and well being.
Section VII.

area.. The collection, examination, evaluation,
identification, and dissemination of information on equipment, materiel, and documents
pertaining to radiological operations and to
AGO 6869A

(3) The nature of the enemy and the
presence of both friendly and hostile civilians,
in stability operations, place additional requirements upon the command for medical intelligence. In addition to determining the receptivity of the local people to western medical
practices, medical intelligence can assist in intelligence activities involving close coordination with and participation in civil police type
operations such as:
(a) Documentation of civilians (and
registration).
( b) Informal interrogations.
(c) Maintenance of extensive dossiers.
( d) Medical civic actions.

( 4) The detailed intelligence required for
psychological operations often is complementary to the accomplishment of the medical mission. Medical personnel are concerned with the
attitudes of friendly forces, the enemy, and the
civilian populace as they affect the health,
medical practices, morale, and the individual's
well being. This large area of mutual interest
indicates the need for close coordination and liaison between the psychological operations
personnel and medical intelligence personnel.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR)
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

3-12. Objectives
The objectives of CBR technical intelligence

•

(2) The medical intelligence officer in
support of guerrilla forces will work closely
with the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task
Force (JUWTF). He will assist the J2 in determining medical intelligence requirements,
establishing EEi and ascertaining which agencies can fulfill the special medical intelligence
requirements for the support of the guerrilla
forces. The Medical Intelligence Officer will
provide information concerning the level of
medical training suitable to the guerrilla force
as well as physical and other medical limitations affectinQ' their performance.

chemical and biological operations under conditions of nuclear or nonnuclear warfare.
b. The collection of samples of chemical, biological, and radiological agents employed
against friendly forces; the identification of
chemical agents and/or transmittal of samples
to a supporting general chemical laboratory
3-7
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for chemical and toxicological analysis; the
transmittal of biological samples to a supporting medical laboratory for microbiological
analysis; and the collection and forwarding of
radiological samples to a supporting general
chemical laboratory for determination of radioisotopic composition.
c. The collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information pertaining to the enemy's
capability of and techniques and procedures
for: decontamination, individual and collective
protection, CBR agent detection and identification systems, warning of CBR attacks, impregnation and reimpregnation of clothing, field
laboratory services, fallout predictions, and radiological monitoring and survey operations.
d. The .collection and dissemination of information on the enemy's capability for chemical
and biological production, their storage installations and stockpiles, and tactical operations
under conditions of nuclear and nonnuclear
warfare.
e. Assistance, within the technical intelligence company capabilities, in developing field
countermeasures against chemical and/or biological operations under conditions of nuclear
and nonnuclear warfare and against radiological operations.

3-8

3-13. Capabilities
Chemical personnel in technical intelligence
units are capable of providing the following
assistance :
a. Examining, evaluating and identifying
captured CBR materiel.
b. Examining, evaluating, and identifying,
when possible, equipment related to CBR operations.
c. Preparing and forwarding samples of biological agents to medical laboratory facilities
for identification.

•

d. Preparing and forwarding samples of
chemical and radiological agents to the general _
chemical laboratory.
e. Providing technical assistance to staffs at
army and corps levels on CBR matters.

f. Maintaining liaison with the theater gen- era! chemical laboratory.
g. Preparing intelligence reports on CBR
matters and estimates of enemy capabilities
and intentions for employing CBR agents.

h. Analyzing and identifying enemy-delivered chemical agents within the limitations of
the CBR agent sampling kit and the CBR
agent analyzing kit.

AGO 6869A
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CHAPTER 4
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

•

•

4-1. General
Planning of the collection effort involves basically the same procedures and considerations
regardless of the type of information desired
-combat, strategic, or technical. The collection of technical information is but one facet of
the overall collection effort of a command. See
appendix B for the major categories of technical intelligence used for planning purposes.
Planning, a continuing process, involves initially the establishment of general policies and
procedures for the collection and production
effort. Subsequently it involves modification
and expansion of the plan to support specific
combat missions and operations of the command. The key to effective collection of technical information is the tactical commander and
his unit; consequently, incorporation of technical intelligence planning into the planning for
specific missions or operations of tactical units
is essential to the production of effective technical intelligence. Preparation of technical intelligence plans is performed by the intelligence officer or staff at each echelon of command. The technical intelligence unit commander is responsible for internal planning of
his unit's operations.
4-2. Initial Planning
Initial planning will be directed more to the establishment of policies and procedures for the
collection and production effort than to the
specific intelligence requirements of the command. Initial planning must include provisions
fora. Proper training of members of the command in recognition, handling, and reporting
of foreign equipment, materiel, and documents.
b. Insuring retention in place, if practicable,
of new or unusual items of captured enemy
equipment and materiel for initial analysis and
AGO 6869A

exploitation by appropriate technical intelligence personnel.
c. Safeguarding captured equipment and materiel against looting, unauthorized destruction, or retention as souvenirs.
d. Standardized reporting of captured enemy
equipment and materiel and dissemination of
reports to higher and other appropriate headquarters.
e. Insuring availability of technical intelligence personnel, as required, in conjunction
with specific~missions or combat operations.
f. Supervision and direction of the evacuation of captured or abandoned enemy equiPment and materiel from collecting points
through or to the field army area .
4-3. Planning Procedures
a. It is imperative that technical intelligence
management, planning, collection, and production procedures be standardized to minimize
duplication of effort and dissipation of resources. Standardization of planning and reporting procedures facilitates production, selection of resources for collection, programming, meeting time schedules, and dissemination of technical intelligence.
b. Development of the technical intelligence
plan involves the following steps:
( 1) Determination of the technical intelligence requirements based on the mission of
the command and the requirements of higher
headquarters.
(2) Determination of priorities to insure
efficient utilization of collection resources.
(3) Balancing of requirements with collection and production capabilities.
( 4) Selection of appropriate collection
agencies and issuance of orders and requests
for specific information.
(5) Formation of appropriate functional
4-1
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teams to insure maximum equipment and materiel exploitation.
( 6) Review of vital technical intelligence
support areas to determine adequacy of equipment tags, evacuation procedures, provisions
for establishment of specific collecting points,
and other administrative and logistical items
and procedures.
c. The planning effort is continued by the supervision by the intelligence officer or member
of his staff over the collection effort to insure
compliance with orders, monitor incoming information, and insure that the overall technical intelligence plan is working effectively.
d. Technical intelligence planning must include consideration of technical intelligence
production, its responsiveness to needs, and the
cost of the overall production effort.

4-4. Technical Intelligence Plan
a. The detailed preparation of the formal
technical intelligence plan is accomplished by
the technical intelligence coordinator who is
attached to the intelligence staff at corps and
higher levels. He coordinates the plan with
technical intelligence units and with other general and special staff elements. The purpose of
the plan is to establish procedures for the following:
( 1) Collection and processing of technical
information.
(2) Handling of foreign equipment and
materiel.
(3) Dissemination of technical intelligence.
( 4) Organization for intelligence task
force operations.
( 5) Employment of the functional technical intelligence teams.
b. A recommended format for the technical
intelligence plan is contained in appendix C.
The plan when issued is an appendix to the intelligence annex of the operations order.
c. Supporting technical intelligence plans
will be prepared at subordinate echelons by the
appropriate intelligence officers.
4-5.

Technical Intelligence Requirements
and Priorities
a. Technical Intelligence Requirementd.

4-2

(1) General. The command intelligence
officer, in coordination with the technical intelligence unit commander, will determine the
technical intelligence requirements of the command and the order of priority. Technical intelligence requirements serve to focus the attention of intelligence agencies of the command on the current specific technical information needs; they also serve as the basis for orders and requests issued to implement the collection effort.
(2) Formulation of Requirements. Formulation of technical intelligence requirements
is accomplished in a manner parallel to that of
the formulation of combat intelligence requirements. The following considerations, with occasional modifications, will serve as guides in
formulation of technical intelligence requirments:
(a) Enemy technical capabilities.
( b) Enemy technical vulnerabilities.
(c) Weather and terrain information.
(d) Technical order of battle informati on.
(e) The next or forthcoming mission or
operation of the command.
(f) Prevention of technical surprise to
the command.
(g) Technical information needs of
higher and adjacent headquarters.
(3) Technical Information Needs of
Higher Headquarters. Each echelon of command receives the technical information requirements of the next higher echelons, integrates them with those of the command, incorporates them into collection directives, and disseminates the directives to subordinate -echelons for guidance in collection planning. M~ny
of these requirements originate at DA and
DOD level and are forwarded in the form of
collection directives or specific intelligence collection requirements (SICR).

b. Priorities. Priorities are utilized to direct
the collection resources of a command toward
definite objectives in priority of their needs.
Requirements from higher headquarters will
include specific priorities. Priorities of the
local command will be governed by command
SOP which will guide the intelligence officer in
assigning priorities to the technical intelliAGO 6869A
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gence requirements. Recurring technical requirements should be programmed in advance
and priorities changed in accordance with the
critical dates involved (e.g., to meet recurring
deadlines for annual studies in specific technical areas).

c. Requests for Technical Intelligence. Requests originating withi_n the field army will be
, forwarded to the appropriate command
through intelligence channels. Such requests
must be as specific as possible. If they are
'based on previous technical and/or combat in-

•

•
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telligence reports, such reports must be fully
identified. Overstatement of requirements must
be avoided. Requests for technical intelligence
will follow theater policies. As a minimum,
they should include the following:
( 1) Requesting organization.
(2) Specific requirement.
(3) Scope of requirement.
( 4) Reason for requirement.
( 5) Pertinent data of assistance to technical intelligence personnel.
(6) Date desired.
(7) References (if applicable) .

•

•
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CHAPTER 5
COLLECTION AND COLLECTION AGENCIES
Section I.

•

•

INTRODUCTION

5-1. General
a. Technical intelligence collection teams are
dependent almost entirely on other units (particularly tactical units) for the acquisition of
foreign equipment, materiel, and documents.
For this reason frequent liaison and coordination with all types of units are essential to
stress the importance of technical intelligence
requirements, particularly those with high
priority. Close coordination with intelligence
personnel operating at lower echelons is particularly important since their operations
throughout any area enable them to acquire
significant technical intelligence information
and materiel. Most items of technical intelligence interest will be acquired initially by tactical units in the course of combat operations.
Tactical or other units may also acquire items
by discovery in an overrun area, seizure (in
raids), or requisitioning, purchase, or confiscation (e.g., as by civil affairs units).
b. The intelligence officer or staff, in developing the technical intelligence plan, will select
those collection agencies which can best fulfill
the needs of technical intelligence. The technical intelligence company should make frequent
recommendations to the command intelligence
officer or staff for inclusion the technical intelligence plan of the company's specific equipment
and materiel needs as well as requirements for
essential technical documents, manuals, and
photographs. When only component elements of
a piece of equipment are required, identification
must be sufficiently precise to preclude the unnecessary collection of the complete item. Collection agencies must be made aware of the po·tential value of new or unusual items of opportunity, i.e., an item not included in requirements or wanted lists .
AGO 6869A

c. Many priority technical intelligence collection requirements generated by programs at
national and DOD levels will be distributed to
collection agencies in the form of the Registry,
Foreign
Material
Requirements
Listing
(FMRL). Such equipment, when obtained,
must be evacuated immediately (see chapter
6). Technical intelligence collection personnel
at corps must maintain familiarity with this
list, and tactical units and other collectors
must receive instructions on the action to be
taken should such listed items be acquired.
5-2. Coordination
a. Frequent coordination between technical
intelligence elements and all types of units
within the field army is essential and will facilitate and supplement the technical information collection effort. Necessity for coordination with tactical units has been mentioned. Invaluable assistance may be obtained by technical intelligence personnel through coordination
·and liaison with such diverse units as air defense, signal, intelligence, Army aviation, and
general and special staff elements. The advantages of coordination with units of the field
army support command and its subordinate facilities should not be overlooked.
b. Accomplishment of the following coordination objectives will contribute immeasurably
to the technical intelligence collection effort:
( 1) Prompt securing and reporting of foreign equipment and materiel by capturing
units.
(2) Location and identification of foreign
items and technical information obtained by
means other than capture.
(3) Acquisition of background and collat5-1
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eral information pertaining to foreign materiel.
( 4) Maintenance of current knowledge
(by technical intelligence personnel) on technical trends and developments.
(5) Determination of the potential for
collecting new or any previously unacquired
items of foreign materiel.
(6) Orientation of combat, combat sup-

Section II.
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(7) Comparison and exchange of information, as authorized, with allied collection and
technical intelligence agencies, as well as with
those of other U.S. services and agencies.

COLLECT·ION AGENCIES

5-3. Introduction
A collection agency for technical intelligence is
a person, unit, organization, or instrumentality
which may collect or acquire foreign materiel,
equipment, or data. Acquisition may be
through routine collection by troops, research,
observation, analysis and evaluation, or interrogation. Technical intelligence collection
agencies include:
a. Combat troop units (including Special
Forces operational detachments).
b. Military intelligence units (e.g., interrogation, counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, and special collection elements).
c. Corps technical intelligence teams.
d. Psychological operations units.
e. Strategic intelligence elements.
f. Long range reconnaissance patrol units.
g. Civil affairs units.
h. Engineer topographic and terrain units.
i. USASA units.
j. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units.
k. Military Police units.
l. Combat service support units.
5-4. Combat Troops
Units in contact are usually the first to encounter new or modified foreign materiel and equipment, often with related operating instructions
or other accompanying technical documents.
The intelligence officer at each level must insure that captured equipment or documents are
recovered for technical intelligence exploitation. Vital technical intelligence materiel and
equipment,
particularly
new discoveries,
should not be destroyed prior to technical in5-2

port, and combat service support units and personnel on their technical intelligence roles, and
determination of their requirements for technical intelligence.

telligence exploitation, circumstances permitting. Enemy equipment, materiel, documents,
and logistical complexes must be promptly safeguarded and reported through intelligence
channels so that the maximum technical data
may be obtained. This is of special importance
in the case of documents relating to enemy
communications-electronics system, e.g., code
books, call signs, frequency tables, signal operating instructions (SOI), standing signal instructions (SSI), cryptographic data and items,
and encrypted items. Items, control knobs, and
switches of communications equipment should
not be moved until they have been photographed or their positions recorded. The foregoing considerations must be included in all
operational plans and in briefings at each level
of command. They should be emphasized in
unit training programs.

5-5. Military Intelligence Units
The activities and operations of milita~y intelligence units within the field army result in access to or acquisition of numerous technical
documents, data and items of information on
foreign equipment and materiel. Military intelligence personnel have frequent contact with
military and civilian personnel who are excellent sources of technical information. The
functions of interrogation, counterintelligence,
and special collection elements result in the acquisition of information of great significance to
technical intelligence. These elements are responsive to specific requests for technical information. Imagery interpretation elements are
particularly helpful in establishing collection
potential and confirming certain aspects of
technical intelligence.
AGO 6869A
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5-6.

Corps Technical Intelligence Collection
Teams
Technical intelligence collection teams are
trained in the collection of and search for
items of technical intelligence interest and related data and information. Targets of their
collection and search activities include foreign
equipment and materiel, facilities, methods,
techniques, and technical activities. Collection
teams are available from the field army, Technical Intelligence Company TOE 30-34, and/or
the cellular teams available from theater
army, TOE 30-600.

5-7.

•

Psychological Operations (PSYOP}
Units
Personnel of PSYOP units in support of theater, field army, corps, and division may lend
assistance in special skills, technical knowledge, and use of such equipment as radios,
loudspeakers, and printing equipment. The peculiarity of psychological operations indicates
that specific requirements which such units
may fulfill are best met by direct coordination
of technical intelligence personnel with
PSYOP units.
5-8. Strategic Intelligence Elements
The strategic intelligence elements at theater
and field army, in their research and study effort, develop information which is of value to
the overall technical intelligence effort. Such
elements will be responsive to broad technical
intelligence requirements, mainly those involving higher echelons of enemy forces.

5-9. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols
(LRRP)
The extended depths into enemy area at which
LRRP operate provide an opportunity for them
to obtain information on new or previously unacquired materiel, locations, estimates of weapons ranges, and other technical data.

•

5-10. Civil Affairs Units
a. The civil affairs organization consists of
staffs, units, and functional teams. Civil affairs
units provide command support or area sup-

AGO 6869A

port to tactical or administrative units and are
assigned to support civil affairs operations at
specific echelons of command or level of government. The size and capabilities of civil affairs units and cellular functional teams may
vary; however, the personnel assigned to them
are trained specialists who are technically
qualified to provide assistance in various specialized functional areas which are considered
to be in the normal range of technical intelligence units. These areas include( 1) Food and agriculture.
(2) Public communications.
(3) Public health.
( 4) Public transportation.
(5) Civilian supply.
(6) Public works and utilities.
(7) Commerce and industry.
b. Among potential sources of civil affairs
units are:
( 1) Civilian technicians among refugees,
evacuees, and displaced persons.
(2) Military personnel with technical
backgrounds.
(3) Civilian technicians and scientists associated with foreign governments or forces.
( 4) Governmental technical documents,
specialized libraries, and archives.
( 5) Industrial and scientific records.
( 6) Technical blueprints, plans, manuals,
or other information containing technical intelligence in the mobility, communications-electronics, weapons and munitions, chemical, biological, and medical fields.
c. Direct assistance to technical intelligence
units may be provided by civil affairs units in
the procurement of technical materiel/equipment, identification of foreign technical personnel, and recruitment or hiring of civilian technicians, scientists, professional people, and
skilled craftsmen and laborers. Civil affairs
personnel may procure( I) Civilian equipment.
(2) Medical instruments, drugs, and other
medical supplies.
( 3) Civilian motor vehicles, construction
equipment, and materials.
( 4) Fuels, lubricants, greases, and propellants.
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5-11.

Engineer Topographic and Terrain
Units
Engineer topographic and terrain units are
designated the responsibility for the collection,
evaluation, and dissemination of topographic
information and terrain intelligence. They normally function at theater, field army, and corps
levels, with the division engineer having the
responsibility at division level. Their special
skills and technical knowledge in the field of
topography and terrain intelligence relate
closely to many categories of technical intelligence and may be of assistance in collection
planning as well as in the analysis and exploitation of foreign materiel and technical documents.
5-1·2. USASA Units
Technical intelligence units must coordinate all
efforts in the field of communications-electronics intelligence with the appropriate USASA
units. USASA is tasked with the timely exploitation of all known or suspected sources
possessing possible target exploitation (TAREX) or other information of USASA interest
as outlined in FM 32-10 and AR 10-122.
T AREX personnel are thoroughly conversant
with USASA technical operations requirements
and can brief and lend assistance to technical
intelligence personnel in determining proper
disposition of materiel of interest to USASA.
5-13.

Explosives Ordnance Disposal {EOD}
Units
a. General. Technical intelligence personnel
should be familiar with EOD activities and
responsibilities (AR 75-15, AR 75-14) in view
of the importance of foreign explosive ordnance
to technical intelligence. The danger of fires
explosions, burns, and accidental functionin~
of explosive ordnance and the possibility that
abandoned items may be boobytrapped dictate
the need for assistance of EOD personnel to
disarm or evacuate such items. FM 9-6 discusses the recovery and evacuation of ammunition. FM 31-45 discusses EOD operations and
responsibilities in support of technical intelligence.
b. Foreign Ammunition. Foreign ammunition is of great value to the intelligence effort.
5-4

Samples of ammunition are of major value to
the research and development efforts of the
Army, and may also have immediate tactical
significance. Particularly, new or modified
items of foreign ammunition are of great significance. Information on foreign ammunition
is invaluable to order of battle intelligence;
evaluation of probable enemy courses of action,
capabilities, and vulnerabilities; and development of countermeasures. Strategic value may
derive from markings, materials used, or the
mere fact of existence of a certain item. Of tactical concern is the knowledge of employment,
effectiveness, and possible countermeasures.
Ammunition, duds, components, and fragments
may reveal the type and caliber of enemy supporting weapons. Recovered sabotage or boobytrap devices may provide valuable indications
of probable enemy courses of action. Manufacturing methods and details of design are valuable to research and development agencies of
the Army. Information of the following items
is of value:
(1) New items of enemy explosive ordnance with complete technical data on construction, markings, and functioning.
(2) Design or changes in design of known
explosive ordnance.
(3) Changes in manufacturing techniques.
( 4) Quality and type of material and explosive content.
(5) Packing, storage, and maintenance
techniques.
( 6) Place and date of manufacture.
(7) All documents relating to the foregoing, including sources or potential sources of
information.
c. EOD Operations. Close coordination is essential since technical intelligence personnel
must rely on EOD personnel for disposal and
evacuation of explosive ordnance, and conversely, EOD units are obligated to notify technical
intelligence personnel of the types and locations
of new items of foreign materiel and munitions.
Recovery and evacuation of explosive ordnance
and related items are discussed in chapter 6.
d. Reports. All information collected by
EOD personnel on first-seen foreign explosive
ordnance must be reported immediately
through EOD control centers to EOD staff ofAGO 6869A
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ficers. At staff level such reports will be placed
in intelligence channels for distribution to all
interested levels of command.
(1) Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP). This report is prepared by EOD
personnel upon recognition of an item of explosive ordnance as an item of technical intelligence value. It is forwarded by the fastest
means available to the EOD control unit for
distribution to intelligence personnel and other
EOD units. A tentative render safe procedure
(RSP) (for EOD use only) will be included
whether it is necessary to render the item safe
or not. When it is necessary to render the item
safe, the EOD team should obtain all essential
information for safe procedure. This report
alerts technical intelligence teams so that they
may be dispatched to the site, and provides
other EOD units with information on new
items of explosive ordnance.
(2)
Complementary Technical Report
(COMTECHREP). These reports are prepared
by technical intelligence teams or in their absence, and when requested by the G2 or his
representative, by EOD personnel. This report
will be as complete and detailed as possible.
When prepared by EOD personnel, it will be
forwarded by the fastest means available
through the EOD control unit to the technical
intelligence company.

5-14. Military Police Units
a. Collection. As collection agencies, military
police units and personnel, particulary criminal investigators, are well suited to assist in
such functions as:

•
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( 1) Collecting and reporting items of foreign materiel on the FMRL.
(2) Locating specific technical items of
equipment.
(3) Locating personalities and activities
within a specialized technical field.
( 4) Reporting items of potential technical
intelligence value obtained from prisoners of
war and civilian internees.
(5) Reporting items of potential value
confiscated or captured in raids.
b. Materiel Obtained by Military Police. The
different items of foreign materiel subject to
confiscation from prisoners of war include
arms; ammunition; military equipment (except mess equipment, metal helmets, and protective masks) ; military documents, such as
military codes and ciphers; pictures and maps
or sketches of military installations or implements of war ; and signal devices. All other
property taken from prisoners is grouped in
the category of retained or impounded property and must be accounted for or ultimately
returned to the prisoner if the capturing forces
assume custody .
c. Marking of PW Materiel. Procedures for
marking foreign materiel of potential technical
intelligence value that is taken froJll PW should
include means of positively identifying the materiel with the PW. This is necessary because
prisoners and materiel will often be evacuated
through separate channels and accurate identification of the PW will facilitate future location. This would also facilitate the identification
of certain property which must eventually be
returned to the PW by regulations .

5-5
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CHAPTER 6
RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF FOREIGN EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS
(STANAG 2084, SOLOG 94)

Section I.

•

INTRODUCTION-

6-1. Concept
a. Within a theater of operations, captured
items are exploited at predesignated collecting
points at division, corps, field army, and theater. Technical intelligence collection teams
are sent forward of the division collecting
points to examine captured items at or near the
scene of acquisition and to arrange for evacuation if necessary. Captured items, except Class
V, can be evacuated directly from the division
collecting point to the technical intelligence
company at field army for exploitation. Collecting points for Class V Ordnance should be either the conventional or special ammunition
supply points (to include missiles). Detailed
information for recovery and evacuation flow
of Class V Ordnance is contained in FM 9-6.
FM 31-45 provides EOD services information.
b. The immediate headquarters of the unit
finding or acquiring items of foreign equipment, materiel, and related documents is responsible to obtain and provide prompt disposition instructions as to whether the items will
be evacuated through technical intelligence or
logistics channels, and to assist the acquiring
unit in safeguarding, recovery, and evacuation
of the items, as required. Technical intelligence
elements are responsible to provide prompt instructions on the need for and the evacuation
of foreign items for technical intelligence purposes. They will perform on-site analysis and
are also responsible to exploit, secure, and
store all items of foreign materiel while in
technical channels.

•

c. Intelligence officers and staffs at all echelons are responsible to insure that prompt inAGO 6869A

structions concerning the need for and evacuation of foreign materiel for technical intelligence are provided to the acquiring unit. They
must coordinate with their logistics counterparts concerning the policies and procedures
governing the recovery and evacuation of foreign materiel. They also provide supervision
over the evacuation of foreign materiel through
intelligence channels.

6-2. Disposal and Transfer
a. Items evacuated through technical intelligence channels will be returned to logistics
channels when no longer required for technical
intelligence purposes. Before such transfer,
however, a technical intelligence element must
ascertain that there is no further requirement
from higher echelons or other agencies for the
item in question.
b. Foreign air and naval materiel, equipment, and related technical documents will be
transferred to U.S. Navy or U.S. Air Force
technical intelligence or logistics channels at
the lowest practical level. Until transfer, such
items will remain in Army technical (or logistics) channels, as appropriate.

c. The acquisition of foreign materiel, in itself, will not necessarily vest title in the
United States. This is true in the case of items
acquired incident to belligerent or peace-keeping operations (e.g., acquired by capture or
confiscation) where ownership of foreign
property (materiel) is regulated by international law. Where there is doubt, the matter
should be referred to the Staff Judge Advocate .
6-1
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Section II.

RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF MATERIEL

6-3. Collecting Points
Collecting points are facilities to which abandoned or unserviceable U.S. and captured foreign materiel is evacuated for classification,
segregation, and proper disposition. Collecting
points operate where needed throughout the
theater of operations. In the field army area,
one or more collecting points are provided for
each corps area and for the field army service
area. These are generally operated by the Collection and Classification Company (TOE
29-139). In the division areas, collecting points
are operated by the division maintenance battalion. Evacuation flow through the collecting
points is shown in Figure 6-1. Detailed information on recovery and evacuation procedures
is contained in FM 29-22 and 29-30.

6-4. Equipment and Materiel Recovery
a. Responsibilities for recovery and evacuation of foreign equipment and materiel at various levels are similar to those for U.S. materiel. The discovery of items of foreign materiel,
however, will be reported by the capturing
unit through intelligence channels. Items for
which there are no disposition instructions
should not be evacuated until coordinated with
technical intelligence elements. The capturing
unit must submit a spot report (chapter 7) to
the int~lligence officer of its higher headquarters. The capturing unit may be directed to
evacuate the item to the collection and classification company or guard it and leave it in place
for on-site preliminary examination by technical intelligence personnel. When materiel does
not have to remain in place for intelligence
evaluation and the discovering unit is incapable
of evacuating it, the unit may request evacuation assistance directly from the command responsible for direct support maintenance. Evacuation may be direct from a maintenance collecting point to the technical intelligence company at field army.
b. Foreign materiel may be of value for technical intelligence purposes, or it may be utilized by friendly forces. Foreign materiel
should be cleared from the battlefield or destroyed to prevent recapture or reclamation by
6-2

the enemy or by guerrilla forces. Technical intellige.nce elements of the military intelligence
battahon and the intelligence officers of all
commands are interested in captured or abandoned items of foreign materiel. Procedures
must be established for the screening and evacuation of materiel. Implementing instructions
are published by subordinate commands in the
form of directives and SOP. Jtems of foreign
materiel being evacuated directly to the field
army support area are reported through
higher headquarters to the technical intelligence company and held until disposition instructions are provided or responsibility is assumed by the technical intelligence company or
another activity. Items which are of no use either for technical intelligence or for equipping
friendly forces are demilitarized and disposed
of as directed by higher headquarters. Only as
a last resort, however, is medical materiel to be
destroyed. Captured medical materiel may be
used to treat PW's and indigenous personnel
after such supplies have been declared safe by
U.S. medical authority.
c. Transportation elements of supported
units are responsible for transporting foreign
materiel from collecting points with the assistance of maintenance units as required, based
on instructions from technical intelligence elements.

•

•
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6-5.

On-Site Analysis by Technical Intelligence Collection Tea ms
a. The objective of on-site analysis (after
foreign materiel is acquired) is to obtain information of immediate tactical value to combat
forces. Information to be obtained includes the
following:
(1) Determination of equipment operational characteristics, performance, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
(2) Identification of new significant weapons.
(3) Analysis for modifications.
( 4) Possible countermeasures.
(5) Identification and proper handling of
radioactive materiel.
b. In the event of acquisition of a large number of like terms of equipment or materiel, the
AGO 6869A
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Figure 6-1. Captured equipment evacuation fiow.

technical intelligence collection teams must examine the materiel and obtain all available information relative to lot numbers, date of manufacture, and factory markings that may assist
in providing information on the item. A sufficient number of items must be evacuated for
detailed evaluation. The remaining items are
then processed through normal evacuation
and/or salvage supply channels.
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a. The capturing unit is responsible for tagging items of foreign materiel. To facilitate
segregation, collection, analysis, and evacuation
of materiel for intelligence purposes, weatherresistant equipment tags, produced locally
within the theater, are securely attached to the
item itself and to the shipping container (Figures 6-2 and 6-3). This responsibility must
be clearly established by command SOP.
b. An outgrowth of the capture of foreign
equipment is the need for an effective "war
trophy" policy. Care must be taken to insure
that "items wanted" are not retained as souvenirs nor destroyed unnecessarily by the capturing unit. Provisions should be made with the
host country to insure that all firearms are
properly registered and conform to existing
firearm laws.
c. Equipment tags accompany the materiel to
its final destination. Article 103, Uniform Code
of Military Justice, is printed on the reverse
side of the tag to forestall tampering (Figure
6-3).
d. In addition to the establishment of proper
safeguards, all military personnel should receive, in conjunction with intelligence training,
instruction in equipment tagging and in the
consequences of failure to execute this responsibility. Troops must be indoctrinated not to
deface original markings on materiel at the
time of its capture.
e. Tagging, marking, crating, and preparation for shipment to CONUS is the major responsibility of the recovery and shipping section of the technical intelligence company in
accordance with field army and theater policies. The section must depend upon field army
support command elements for the preparation
and shipment of bulky items.

6-7.

IEvacuC1J~ocn

Guidall'illi:a

The general plans, P<?licies, and procedures for
evacuation of all foreign equipment and materiel are prescribed by the joint/unified/theater
and field army headquarters. These general
plans are based upon DA and DOD policies and
guidance. Each command echelon within the
field army must insure that its plans are in accordance with field army directives and the
overall field army technical intelligence plan.

6-8.
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a. The primary interest of technical intelligence units in explosive foreign ordnance has
been mentioned. However, the assistance of
EOD personnel in the examination, movement,
and evacuation of explosive ordnance is mandatory. First-seen foreign ordnance items
should be rendered safe by EOD personnel if
possible. If this is impossible, the item should
be rendered safe in place by destructive methods which will minimize damage to the item.
Complete photographic coverage of the item in
place, both before and after destructive safing
should be obtained. Foreign, explosive-type
chemical or biological ammunition, after being
rendered safe, is forwarded through technical
intelligence channels to the general chemical
laboratory for extraction of samples of the
agent filling. Extracted chemical agent samples
-are analyzed by the chemical laboratory, and
extracted biological agents samples are forwarded to a medical service laboratory for
identification.
b.- Unidentifiable items and those required by
higher authority should be recovered whenever
possible, even at considerable risk. Recovery of
components or fragments of such items may be
equally important. Recovery is invaluable to
technical intelligence and to CONUS-based research elements in the development of disposal
methods and tools.
c. The following guidelines apply to the recovery and evacuation of explosive ordnance:
(1) New or unknown types of foreign explosive ordnance recovered by EOD personnel
must be turned over to technical intelligence
units for disposition. Security classification of
AGO 6869A
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Figure 6-2. Equipment marking tag .
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ARTICLE 103, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTlcE
a. All persons subject to this code
property taken from the enemy for the
States, and shall give notice and turn
thority, without delay, all captured or
their possession, custody or control.

shall secure all public
service of the United
over to the proper auabandoned property in

b. Any person subject to this code who: (1) fails to carry
out the duties prescribed in subdivision (a) of this article;
(2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of
captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or
expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another
directly or indirectly connected with him; or (3) engages in
looting or pillaging; shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct.

•
•

Figure 6-3. Reverse side of equipment marking tag-Article 103.

the items and their components will not be
lower than SECRET.
(2) Foreign nuclear weapons or components, to include sabotage devices, are evacuated through technical intelligence channels.

Security classification of such items will not be
lower than SECRET RESTRICTED DAT A.
( 3) Security and technical escorts are required to provide safety control for shipments
of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other hazAGO 6869A
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ardous items of explosive ordnance. Within the
field army, technical intelligence personnel will
coordinate with appropriate staffs to establish
the need and arrange for technical escorts. For
shipments to CONUS, the theater intelligence
officer determines the need and arranges for
technical escorts.
( 4) Collection of technical intelligence
data will in many instances entail dismantling
of the ordnance and stripping of fuzes and
other dangerous components for analysis and
evaluation. These operations will be performed
only by experienced EOD personnel. Dismantling and stripping are conducted only in response to a specific requirement for such action
which has been placed through technical intelligence or EOD staffs.
(5) Captured mines and boobytraps
should be analyzed or tested only by trained
weapons/munitions specialists. Extreme caution must be exercised when taut wire and pull
releases or similar releases are encountered.
Unusual mechanisms used as boobytraps
should be reported immediately by the finding
unit through intelligence channels to the techSection Ill.

6-11 . Evacuation
a. Technical documents should be evacuated
with the materiel to which they concern. If the
operational situation prevents evacuation of
the materiel, the documents should be identified

•
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Security and Escort
Many items of foreign materiel acquired by
U.S. Forces and determined to be of technical
intelligence value will require safeguarding in
storage as well as during evacuation. Such
items may be sensitive due to their criticality
. or because of a U.S. classification assigned
(para 6--8 and 7-13). Initially, the finding unit
is responsible for safeguarding materiel, based
on instructions from the next higher headquarters, to prevent looting, loss, destruction, or recapture by the enemy. Military Police elements
normally provide physical security at storage
and during evacuation when foreign materiel
is sensitive or of special value. Particular attention must be paid to the peculiarities of nuclear weapons escort and the technical escort
requirement for CBR materiel.

RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

6-10. General
Doctrine for the handling of captured documents is contained in FM 30-15, Intelligence
Interrogation. Technical documents, as they are
of concern to technical intelligence, are those
documents usually found with materiel which
relate to technical design or operation of the
materiel. Such technical documents may also
be acquired separately from the equipment or
materiel they concern (e.g., from prisoners of
war, from files in overrun areas, found on the
battlefield). It is essential that technical intelligence personnel coordinate closely with interrogation. elements to facilitate exchange of information.

AGO 6869A

nical intelligence ~ompany by spot report.
Countermeasures must be coordinated with
EOD personnel. Final disposal of explosive
components or hazardous materials associated
with such devices and with recovered ammunition is the responsibility of EOD personnel.

with the materiel by means of an attached sheet
marked "TECHDOC" listing the precise location, time and circumstances of capture, and a
description, as detailed as possible, of the materiel. Adequate and sufficient photographs of
the equipment should be produced and evacuated with the document.
b. Documents obtained through liaison with
interrogation elements should be accompanied
by a report of pertinent information obtained
from prisoners of war.

c. The general guidance in this manual concerning recovery and evacuation of materiel
pertains also to technical documents. However,
the diverse nature of documents acquired and
their frequent interest to various agencies and
commands dictate the necessity for technical
intelligence personnel to be familiar with the
categories of documents and appropriate handling procedures stipulated in FM 30-15 .

6-7
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CHAPTER 7
PROCESSING, DISSEMINATION, AND USE
(STANAG 2084, 2097; SOLOG 94)

Section I.

•

•

7-1. General
a. The wide range of technical proficiency
necessary for mission accomplishment will not
always be found within the technical intelligence collection elements or the technical intelligence company. Assistance from medical, ordnance, signal, engineer, and other specialized
agencies and units will have to be sought.
Within the technical intelligence company itself, a coordinated effort of diverse specialists
is necessitated by the broad range of the technical equipment/materiel acquired .
b. Processing of technical information involves recording, evaluation, and inter.pretation of the collected information. ln urgent situations technical information can be processed
as received without waiting to collect supporting information, particularly if background
files and an adequate data base have been established and maintained. For example,
information/intelligence containing data on
foreign missiles capable of carrying nuclear,
chemical, or biological warheads, the early use
of which is a probability, is so urgent that no
delay between acquisition of the information
and dissemination can be permitted.
7-2. Recording
Technical information and data are recorded in
journals, workbooks, and technical intelligence
files to facilitate evaluation and interpretation.
Recording involves reducing information and
data to written or graphic form and aids technical analysts in grouping related items of information. It expedites the preparation and
dissemination of technical intelligence reports,
however, the recording step may be omitted to
AGO 6869A

PROCESSING
permit rapid evaluation, interpretation, and
immediate dissemination of urgent tactical information to the unit(s) concerned.

7-3. Evaluation
a. Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of the information, the reliability of the
source and the agency from which the information was derived, and the accuracy or credibility of the information. The system of evaluation is described in FM 30-5 and has been
standardized for use by NATO forces and
other allies.
(1) Evaluation involves systematically
arranging all pieces of information and comparing known data with the current state of
the art, a continuing process at all appropriate
echelons. As technical information flows to the
technical intelligence company, it must be associated with all related data including previous
technical reports.
(2) Technical evaluation must take into
consideration the industrial and scientific base
and capabilities of foreign nations. Evaluation
estimates based solely on U.S. standards must
be avoided inasmuch as foreign equipment and
materiel may appear wholly inferior when
judged only by U.S. standards.
b. Technical information received from intelligence sources and agencies will consist primarily of reports on the use of new or modified
items of foreign materiel, the capture of materiel and documents, and extracts of technical
information from intelligence reports. These
reports normally will have been given an evaluation by the collecting agency and/or the appropriate intelligence staff. Such evaluations
7-1
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notwithstanding, technical intelligence personnel are obligated to re-evaluate each item of information based on their technical data base
and technical experience.
c. Technical evaluation includes the following considerations:
( 1) Does the information concern foreign
materiel known or suspected to be in use in the
area of operations?
(2) Will the information have an immediate effect on the command mission?
(3) Is the use of new materiel by the
enemy indicated, or are increased enemy capabilities indicated?
( 4) What is the immediate effect cm
forces in combat?
(5) Does the information have present or
future value; if so, to whom?
7-4. Interpretation
Interpretation consists of analysis, integration,
and deduction. It is the mental process of determining the importance of information, integrating this with other technical data, and
making a deduction as to the value and significance of the information.
a. Analysis. Analysif requires a thorough
knowledge of foreign equipment and materiel
to include past technological trends, developments, and tactical doctrine on equipment use.
It involves more detailed research as the volume of technical date increases. Analysis
within the technical intelligence company is
centralized in the evaluation and analysis platoon.

b. Integration.
(1) Integration is the combining of numerous isolated elements of technical informa-

Section 11.

7-6.

•

7-5. Processing by Intelligence S·taff
Sections
The processing discussed above does not replace the normal intelligence processing within
the G2 staff elements. Technical intelligence is
integrated with all other intelligence by the G2
staff and, as one facet of the intelligence product, enables the G2 staff to arrive at an estimate of the capabilities, limitations, and future
courses of action of foreign military forces. It
is re-emphasized that, as in all steps of technical intelligence production, close coordination
between lhe technical intelligence company
and the organic technical intelligence element
of the G2 staff is mandatory.

•

ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

Considerations
a. The producers of technical intelligence
must keep in mind that actual and potential
foreign capabilities, limitations, and probable
courses of action are under continuous development at the field army, theater, and national
levels. Based upon the technical intelligence
produced, new requirements for U.S. equipment, doctrine and countermeasures may

7-2

tion with other technical data to form one or
more logical conclusions. Technical intelligence
conclusions are made with primary emphasis
upon the tactical mission. This phase of interpretation requires judgment, experience, varied background knowledge, and knowledge of
scientific methods. Formulated technical hypotheses (conclusions) should be tested for validity and reliability.
(2) The technical intelligence company
must integrate the technical informaticm provided by all intelligence collection agencies to
construct an objective assessment of foreign
capabilities.
c. Deduction. Deduction, the last step in interpretation, consists of deriving meaning
from the hypotheses that have been developed
and tested. Deduction provides answers as to
the meaning aml significance of technical intelligence and data in relation to the tactical situation and area of operation.

evolve. Intelligence that will assist in the preparation of new U.S. military equipment, doctrine, and countermeasures must be considered
by the technical intelligence producer during
the entire technical intelligence production
cycle.
I>. Factors to be considered by tactical technical intelligence units and staff officers include, but are not limited to, the following:
AGO 6869A
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(1) Effects of terrain and weather.
(2) Characteristics, performance, and effectiveness of foreign equipment and materiel.
(3) Effectiveness
of
countermeasures
against foreign equipment.
(4) New design features and modifications of old and/or new equipment.
( 5) Overall combat intelligence requirements.

7-1·. Technical Reference Library

•
•

•

a. Technical intelligence processing, research, analysis, and evaluation cannot be conducted without a current data base. The need
for specific data requirements, performance
characteristics, equipment descriptions, and
operational limitations of materiel, and the extensive need for integration and collation of
technical information covering wide technical
areas necessitate the establishment of a technical intelligence reference library by the techni~l intelligence company. As a minimum, the
technical library should include( 1) Technical Bulletins.
(2) Foreign Equipment Handbooks (by
country).
(3) Foreign Materiel Catalog (FOMCAT) TB 381-5 series.
(4) DIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence Registers.
(5) Organizational and Logistical Data
Handbooks.
(6) Enemy tactics and operational concept studies.
(7) Technical equipment documents and
studies.
(8) Order of battle handbooks.
(9) Foreign Tables of Organization and
Equipment.
(10) Foreign materiel exploitation reports.
(11) Equipment vulnerability studies.
(12) Threat studies and assessments.
b. This technical reference library will provide not only accurate and timely technical information and intelligence references, but will
serve to aid interested field army units and
agencies with limited and specialized technical
information and thereby reduce the need for
direct technical support. Selection of library
references should be based on the needs of
AGO 6869A

combat, combat support, and combat service
support users and field army requirements.
7-8. Use of Experts and/or Organizations
a. The technical intelligence company will
sometimes require assistance from military
and/or civilian personnel or organization to assist in the technical analysis of materials to
fulfill a special tactical or strategic mission.
This may occur when the expertise needed to
solve a highly technical and complex problem
which is· not available within the technical intelligence company. Therefore, maintaining an
up-to-date "Technical Expert File" (of names)
will prove invaluable. When utilized, these "experts" should work directly with the technical
intelligence company, and must possess the
proper security clearance; they should be used
as consultants/advisors for a short period of
time. The most important criterion governing
the use of these individuals is that such service
should normally be voluntary.
b. Experts whose training could be of special
assistance to technical intelligence units for
analysis and production services include(1) Ammunition maintenance technicians.
(2) Guided missile maintenance personnel.
(3) Nuclear weapons specialists.
(4) Ammunition supply specialists.
(5) Data processing personnel.
( 6) Electronic countermeasures personnel.
(7) Cryptographic personnel.
(8) Communications security analysts.
(9) Optical specialists.
( 10) Explosive ordnance specialists .
( 11) Petroleum product analysts.
( 12) Guided missile propellant and explosive specialists.
(13) Geographers, geologists, and/or construction specialists.
(14) Photography experts.
(15) Communications specialists.
(16) Weapon systems analysts.
( 17) Chemists, physicists, and biologists.
( 18) Radar specialists.
(19) Indigenous surgeons and medical specialists .
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(20) Transportation operations and movements specialists.
(21) US ASA T AREX personnel.
7-9.

Photography

a. Photographs, diagrams, and charts (valuable sources of permanent information for
technical analysis and evaluation) are used by
technical intelligence analysts to supplement
their finished reports. Photographs of materiel
acquired in fast-moving tactical situations can
be sent to the rear by technical intelligence collection teams prior to evacuation of the actual
equipment. The photograph may be the only
item available to the analyst if the equipment
becomes lost, damaged, destroyed, or recaptured. Technical intelligence collection teams
at corps must be cognizant that one of their
first responsibilities should be to photograph,
diagram, or sketch in place all items of intelSection Ill.

•

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

7-10. Reports
Six types of technical intelligence reports are
used in technical intelligence collection and
production. These area. Spot Report. This oral or written report
(FM 30-5) is prepared by the acquiring units
and/or intermediate command echelons to report rapidly, by electrical or other means, the
acquisition of foreign materiel and technical
documents. Such reports are forwarded
through intelligence channels to the technical
intelligence company. Corps may use this report as a basis for dispatch of technical intelligence collection teams if none are in the acquisition area. The basic items of this report
should include as a minimum:
( 1) Who is reporting (unit) .
(2) What is being reported.
(3) Where and when (coordinates).
(4) How much materiel.
( 5) Condition of materiel.
(6) Whom to contact.
b. Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP). This report is prepared and transmitted by the quickest possible means through
intelligence channels on all captured foreign
materiel. It is prepared by corps technical in7-4

ligence value. As many different angles as possible should be portrayed.
b. Photographs must be analyzed, evaluated,
and compared. They should be accompanied by
appropriate written descriptions to enhance
their value to the analyst. Skill and training of
the analyst are essential to maximum exploitation of photographs. All photographs should
contain a ruler, scale, or other measuring comparison to portray relative size of an object.
c. Long-range reconnaissance patrols, special
forces operational detachments, and other intelligence collection elements may photograph
special items of technical intelligence interest
when operating behind enemy lines. Use of
such units for technical intelligence missions
must be coordinated at the appropriate echelon, and personnel must be thoroughly briefed
on technical intelligence requirements prior to
dispatch.

telligence collection teams or the capturing
unit. The preliminary report contains a general description of the equipment and places
emphasis on alerting tactical units to significant technical information of immediate tactical importance. It is prepared in the format
shown below :
(1) Date found, location (map reference).
(2) Type of equipment and quantity.
(3) Origin.
(4) Brief description with distinguishing
marks.
( 5) Technical characteristics with an immediate value.
(6) Name of the commander of capturing
unit.
(7) Time and origin of the message.
(8) Tentative render safe procedure
(RSP) (for EOD use only).
c. Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP). These reports are prepared by
technical intelligence collection teams operating throughout a corps area in support of
corps elements and supplements information in
the PRETECHREP. The formats of these reports are given in appendix D. When the situation does not permit Air Force technical intelAGO 6869A
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ligence teams to arrive at the scene of captures
or downed enemy aircraft prior to destruction,
recapture, or loss, Army technical intelligence
personnel will initially examine and submit
COMTECHREP Type A. This report will then
- constitute the only information which can be
provided to Air Force technical _intelligence. In
the event items of enemy navy materiel are
acquired, Type A report format can be modified for reporting such acquisition.

d. Detailed Technical Report (DETECHREP). This report is the responsibility of
the technical intelligence company at field
army. No format can be specified because of
the diversity of its content.

e. Technical Document Report (TECH DOC).
This report is prepared on all captured enemy
technical documents such as maintenance handbooks, operation manuals, drawings, and
sketches. No format is prescribed.

•

f. Special Technical Report. This report is
· prepared as required by field army G2 staff elements and higher echelons to provide input to
studies and plans. It contains special information on items of significant intelligence interest. No format is prescribed and content is governed by the nature of the technical intelligence desired.
7-11. Nomenclature
All technical intelligence report nomenclature
should be, to the extent possible, in consonance
with overall unified/joint/theater policies and
guidance. Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc army
weapons
has
been
NATO-standardized
(STANAG 2097). Principles of this nomenclature are as follows:

•

a. Nomenclature of the country of origin for
Soviet Bloc army weapons, equipment, and vehicles is used whenever it is known. If unknown, a short descriptive title will be devised
and used as an interim measure only. Short interim titles will be issued by higher headquarters (theater, joint, or unified command) as
soon as possible after sighting details have been
received. Description titles, as well as interim
titles, should include the country of design and
manufacture (when the country of manufacture is different from the country of design) or
AGO 6869A

the best estimate thereof; should include a
question mark after the country name, when
appropriate; and should become progressively
more specific, e.g.:
( 1) E. German ( ?) Hand Grenade M
1960.
(2) E. German copy of Sov Hand Grenade
M 1960.
(3) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand
Grenade M 1960.
(4) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand
Grenade A.KG-3.
When the manner in which information was
obtained warrants protection of a confidential
source or method, the originating (reporting)
agency will assign an appropriate security
classification.
b. Nomenclature for any given piece of
equipment will include an adequate description
to show:
(1) The role of the equipment, e.g., medium tank, howitzer, antitank gun.
(2) Type of chassis, when applicable (assumed to be wheeled unless otherwise stated),
e.g., half-tracked, tracked .
c. The caliber of all weapons will be referred
to in millimeters and will always be placed immediately preceding the description of the
weapon. The abbreviation "mm" for millimeters will be used.
d. The year when the equipment was first ,_.
seen or known to exist will be indicated by use
of the letter M and the four figures of the year.
These figures will become a part of the title,
e.g., 100-mm Field Gun M 1964.
e. The items to be included in the title of
each group of weapons and equipment, as weJI
as examples of these titles are shown in appendix E.
7-1-2. Report Credibility
All technical reports produced by the technical
intelligence company should bear the following
statement on the cover to give official credence
to the report:
This is a United States Army Technical Intelligence Report. The data
contained herein was derived through
limited testing, analysis, and examination utilizing U.S. Army Laboratory and test facilities .
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7-13. Security Considerations
a. Classification. Technical reports from the
technical intelligence company are classified in
accordance with appropriate Army regulations
in the 380-series. When equipment is acquired
through a friendly foreign government, the specific security classification assigned by that government must be adhered to and given equivalent protection by being assigned to Group 1
in accordance with AR 380-6.
b. Security Policies.
( 1) At times, technical intelligence involves sensitive security equipment/materiel
and will require stringent security controls by
the technical intelligence unit. A unit technical
intelligence SOP on security is mandatory in
order to provide a security framework adequate to support operational requirements. The
technical intelligence SOP must be precise, yet
flexible. The following guidelines are pro·vided:
(a) Requirements for sensitive technical intelligence materiel in support of assigned
missions must be carefully planned and should
be revised periodically.
(b) Information and materiel should be
disseminated on a need-to-know basis in accordance with specific security regulations.
( c) Care must be taken not to overclassify.
(2) Indigenous personnel may be utilized
in some situations. Because of the sensitive nature of many areas of technical intelligence, information should be released to such personnel
only after:
Section IV.

•

(b) The security requirements imposed·
by security regulations and procedures have
been complied with concerning release of sensitive information.
(c) Care has been taken to furnish only
that information for which an explicit needto-know has definitely been established.
(3) Special provisions must be prescribed
by technical intelligence units for handling all
captured communications and electronic equipment and documents. This equipment and related documents must be classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher and designated "crypto,"
and tagged and evacuated to the nearest
USASA element as soon as practicable. Examples are as follows:
(a) Speech security devices.
(b) Teletypewriter security devices.
(c) Data security devices.
(d) Off-line encryption devices.
(e) Document, manuals, circuitry diagrams, and all ancillary equipment.

•

(4) The following items must be classified
SECRET or higher and evacuated to the nearest USASA element:
(a) Key lists.
( b) Code books and sheets.
(c) Encrypted messages.
(d) Signal operating instructions.
(e) Map coordinate overlays.

DISSEMINATION AND USE

7-14. Dissemination
a. Methods. Timely dissemination of technical intelligence reports is of maximum importance to· tactical, combat support, and combat
service support commanders. The methods
used to disseminate technical intelligence depend upon the detail and urgency of the intelligence and upon the intended users. Primary
consideration must be given to the needs of the
tactical users. The spot report, PRETECHREP, and COMTECHREP are used nor7-6

(a) It has been determined that release
of the information is in the best interests of
the United States.

mally for initial reports of acquisition of materiel and supplementary information. The
most common means of disseminating processed technical intelligence are:
( 1) Detailed technical reports.
(2) Technical intelligence bulletins.
(3) Technical reviews and summaries.
(4) Special technical reports.
( 5) Special technical studies and estimates.
(6) Handbooks.

AGO 6869A
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(7) Technical pamphlets.
(8) Briefings.
(9) Liaison visits.

b. Dissemination of Explosive Ordnance Information. Technical intelligence on explosive
ordnance may be disseminated from any level
where it originates. Pertinent extracts should
be provided to EOD personnel at all levels to
permit development of new EOD tools and render-safe procedures, as required. EOD control
units will insure that pertinent information
contained in PRETECHI!EPS and COMTECHREPS is disseminated to each EOD unit
under its control and to other EOD control
units if appropriate. The Foreign Science and
Technology Center, U.S. Army Materiel Command, makes available foreign ammunition
items, reports, and evaluations required for
study and use in developing EOD tools and
render-safe procedures. Secrecy of EOD tools
and render-safe procedures is important to
prevent the enemy from learning the development of effective disarming procedures.

•

•

7-15. Use o~ Technical Intelligence
a. The user units and agencies are even more
diverse than the technical fields concerned. It
is beyond the scope of this manual to specify
even the general requirements of various units
and agencies. The requirements for higher
echelons, intelligence staff sections, and commanders have been discussed. All units and
agencies must familiarize themselves with the

AGO 6869A

capabilities and limitations of technical intelligence, and must insure incorporation of their
technical intelligence needs into the technical
intelligence collection and production plans.
The advantages of coordination and liaison to
insure receipt of pertinent technical intelligence reports and information cannot be overemphasized. Technical intelligence personnel
of units and intelligence staffs must develop
familiarization with the technical needs of the
many different units. It must also be recognized that it is a rare technical item that is of
interest to only one unit or agency.
b. Examples of specific technical intelligence
interests are as follows :
(1) Military Police units have a continuing interest in foreign physical security devices
and intrusion detection alarms, traffic control
devices, police and investigation equipment,
police record systems, riot control munitions,
industrial defense equipment, and boobytraps.
It is obvious that some or all of these items will
also be of interest to tactical troops, counterintelligence elements, civil affairs units, EOD,
and others.
(2) Psychological operations units are interested in items of technical intelligence, not
for their technical intelligence value, but for
their possible use in psychological operations
(e.g., defective weapons and ammunition, and
documents which would tend to discredit the
enemy) .
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CHAPTER 8
STABILITY OPERATIONS
Section I.

•

•

INTRODUCTION

8-1. General
a. The scope of insurgent warfare may encompass elite and professionally trained military forces as well as local guerrillas or parttime fighters and noncombatants. There will be
substantial differences in armament, organization, training, equipment, and overall effectiveness. Technical intelligence collectors and analysts must take cognizance of these differences
in their analyses. Familiarity with insurgent
tactics, doctrine, and organization will greatly
enhance the technical analysis a~d evaluation
capabilities of the technical intelligence unit.
b. Technical intelligence personnel must be
thoroughly familiar with the characteristics,
capabilitiE~s, and performance of the small
arms and weapons originating in many
friendly and unfriendly nations. The insurgent
usually has a limited capability to perform
modifications to weapons and materiel. If these
modifications are not carefully analyzed and
evaluated, their significance and the conclusions drawn can be misleading. Technical intelligence derived during stability operations
often has serious national and political consequences; it must, therefore, be accurate.
8-2. Special Considerations
a. Technical intelligence emphasis, goals, and
priorities in stability operations will differ
slightly from those in limited and general conflict. The basic principles of technical intelligence remain unchanged. However, some procedures may vary and additional considerations
will be necessary in applying these principles.
Military units, for example, may be dispersed
for
independent/decentralized
operations.
Movement of technical intelligence personnel
must be by the fastest means available. Evacuation of foreign equipment and materiel
AGO 6869A

must be performed by the most secure means
available, usually by air, to prevent recapture
or loss. The insurgent's equipment and materiel normally is less sophisticated in the early
phases of internal conflict than that of a conventional enemy; their weaponry consists primarily of small arms, automatic weapons, and
mortars obtained from friendly, neutral, and
hostile nations. Such equipment is often augmented by primitive, but nevertheless effective,
weapons such as crossbows, man-traps, and
sharpened stakes.
b. Arms caching and weapons smuggling are
frequently resorted to by the insurgent. Arms
caches may be of political and tactical significance. Arms caches and logistical stores should
be carefully analyzed and evaluated for technical intelligence, usually in a combined effort
with the host country. The discovery of arms
caches, when carefully exploited by functionally integrated technical teams, may lead to
valuable intelligence about the overall insurgerit
tactical situation. Normally all captured equipment and materiel becomes the property of the
host country, and for this reason combined operations, liaison, and coordination are important to insure full exploitation. The disposition
of foreign materiel may be governed by status-of-forces or other agreements, thus complicating the collection and analysis problems. As
in a conventional situation, close coordination
of technical intelligence personnel with military units and all U.S. government departments and agencies engaged in collection is important. Combined (U.S.-host country)
technical intelligence operations are particularly effective in improving the overall collection capability due to the language ability and
area knowledge of the host country military
personnel.
8-1
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Section II.

RESPONS,IBILITIES

8-3. Technical lntellignece Emphasis
a. In stabilit,.v operations, technical intelligence personnel perform the normal duties described for conventional operations, but particular emphasis must be placed on the following:
(1) Training host country combat personnel, as necessary, in technical intelligence collection and evacuation procedures.
(2) Coordinating technical intelligence
matters with other services having a technical
intelligence interest and with the host country.
(3) Assisting in the organization and development of a host country technical intelligence capability, if required.
( 4) Performing increased on-site technical
intelligence analysis and evniuation of enemy
equipment and materiel.
(5) Providing technical advice and assistance to host country military technical intelligence personnel, as required.
( 6) Assisting in adapting ideas and techniques of insurgents for use by U.S. Forces.
b. Equally important for the technical intelligence analyst and the intelligence community
is the ever-present danger of capture of
friendly weapons and equipment. An examination of the serial numbers of recaptured weapons will reveal which friendly unit lost the
item, when, and possibly to whom. The movement of the enemy unit may possibly be traced.
Coordination throughout the intelligence community will assist in determining whether the
item was held by the capturing enemy unit because of obvious and known needs for the materiel or whether the item might have been
transferred to another enemy unit with greater
need for the specific item.
Section Ill.
8-6. General
a. Prior to initial commitment of U.S. combat forces, the early detection and identification of equipment and materiel used by hostile
forces assume paramount importance. Identification of outside logistical sources of supply is
imperative and assists in the determination of
8-2

8-4.

Role of the Unit Intelligence Advisor

•

a. The intelligence advisor plays a basic role
in technical intelligence collection by coordinating host country requests for technical intelligence support, providing technical intelligence advice, and informing U.S. intelligence
staffs when significant discoveries of insurgent
equipment, materiel, or arms caches are made
by the unit to which he is attached. Technical
intelligence collection/analyst personnel mus(
keep the unit intelligence adviser informed of
important guerrilla weaponry devek,Jments in
addition to helping him maintain a technical
intelligence items wanted list.
b. Since the unit intelligence advisor is responsible for advising and training host country forces in all aspects of intelligence, to include technical intelligence, a mutual flow of
technical information between the advisor and
advisee is highly advantageous. Mutually defined goals and objectives between advisor and
advisee are essential.

8-5. Combat Service Support Role
If and when the insurgency movement progresses, technical intelligence becomes more
conventional in its support of tactical operations. Technical intelligence also assumes its
normal role in combat service support. The establishment of a combined U.S. and host country technical intelligence center may become
advisable. In this event, the channeling of
technical intelligence reports and dissemination of processed technical intelligence should
be precisely established by SOP.

•

PROCEDURES
diplomatic action, overall strategy, force structure, and military equipment which should be
deployed for successful mission accomplishment.
b. The capabilities and knowledge of U.S.
Military Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Groups, or Military Missions present in a

•

•
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foreign country experiencing insurgency can
supplement the technical intelligence data base
and facilitate initiation of the U.S. military
technical intelligence collection and analysis
effort.

8-7. Analysis

•

a. Technical intelligence collection and analysis becomes more complicated in stability operations inasmuch as the combined political or
military objective often is more than merely
seizing and holding terrain. Information on the
technical characteristics of insurgent weapons
must be continuously updated and expanded as
the weapons or modifications appear. When a
blockade is used to stop the flow of arms and
ammunition to the insurgent, technical intelligence analysts must be particularly thorough
in collection, analysis, and evaluation. For example, supply shortages and small changes in
the chemical composition of propellants and
demolitions might be indicators of the potential effectiveness of the blockade.
b. It is imperative for political/military purposes that technical intelligence personnel keep
abreast of outside military assistance furnished the insurgent such as modern air defense missiles, guns, propellants, communications-electronics equipment, and petroleum
products. For example, analysis of new missile
propellants may give vital indications of enemy
tactical capabilities.

8-8.

•

Investigative Data

a. The technical intelligence collection teams
have a responsibility to conduct weapon and
ammunition cache investigations and make reports thereon. Numerous caches, depots, salvage points, and small factories may be discovered over a period of time and should be exploited to the extent possible. The weapons and
ammunition discovered may be a mixture from
numerous nations, and statistical data must be
maintained on all weapons, ammunition, and
supplies captured or found· by U.S. and
friendly forces.
b. One of the most important problems facing technical intelligence specialists will be
planning for the exploitation of arms caches.
Priorities must be established with primary
consideration given to tactical needs. If the
AGO 6869A

number of caches discovered is so great as to
cause the involvement of all technical intelligence specialists, exploitation of caches will'
have to be on a selective basis. The entire analysis effort can be materially assisted by proper
troop orientation on all aspects of technical intelligence, close coordination with major tactical headquarters, and placement of emphasis
on the items wanted list.
c. Tunnels and excavations are frequently
used by the insurgents to provide protection
for personnel and supplies and may contain a
wide variety of potential intelligence information that should be collected. The following
checklist should be used by tactical units in
submitting tunnel information reports:
(1) Location (coordinates).
(2) Evaluation of construction.
(3) Specialized underground areas (classroom, training) .
( 4) Installation of communications facilities.
(a) Internal to internal.
( b) Internal to external.
( c) Use of special antennas.
(5) Power available.
(6) Alternate/emergency power system.
(7) Storage facilities (effect of weather
on)
(8) Assessment of construction quality of
internal operational facilities (shops, toolmaking, repairs).
(9) General assessment of health facilities.
(a) Waste disposal.
( b) Water facilities.
( c) Contamination.
( d) Care of sick and wounded.
(e) Assessment of medical standards.
(10) Assessment of training facilities (if
applicable).
(11) Measures taken against severe
weather.
(12) Assessment of political propaganda
indoctrination (documents, news posters, magazines, printing presses).
(13) Evaluation of use of environmental
resources.
(14) Evaluation of local/commercial resources (lumber, cotton).

(15) Special items of interest.
( 16) Recreation facilities.
(17) Assessment of defensive areas.
(18) Internal security or warning devices.
(19) Assessment of intelligence or intelligence-related activities.
(20) New field expedients (of major and
constant interest).
(21) Neutralization action (i.e. destroyed,
partially destroyed, CS gas).
d. Information on the use of primitive weapons, such as poisonous spikes, crossbows, and
deadfalls, must be widely disseminated together with appropriate countermeasures.

sition of necessary linguistic and technically
qualified civilian personnel. In stability operations, civilians having technical knowledge
may come under civil affairs control, especially
upon liberation of an area from insurgent control. Their evacuation for interrogation purposes may not be desirable because of the attitude of the civil population at the time. However, the civil population may be screened by
U.S. or host country civil affairs units or police
elements. When civilians having technical skills
are identified as possible contributers to technical intelligence, they should be referred to
technical intelligence elements.

$-9. IL@sios~oic<a1~ Sys~ell'il'il
Although the logistical system of the insurgent
may be rudimentary and primitive, the technical intelligence analysts may be required to deal
with a variety of commodity items for intelligence purposes (e.g., salt rations, agricultural
products, primitive drugs, and serums). The
capability of the insurgent's logistical system
to support sustained military operations may
be determined in part through technical analysis of commodity items.

8-] ] .
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a. A major problem of technical intelligence
is the acquisition of the necessary language
skills and experience to perform technical
analysis and evaluation of technical equipment
in a foreign country. Therefore, combined operations with the host country forces are usually imperative. Host country military personnel who possess some limited technical training
are used to assist in overcoming language and
area problems.
b. Indigenous technical intelligence personnel who are thoroughly familiar with the culture and environment of the insurgent are an
asset to the analysis, evaluation, and collation
of certain types of technical data and information. For example, the habits of guerrillas living in underground tunnels may be useful in
evaluating and updating important technical
data. Classrooms, billets, hospitals, and stored
materiel may be indicators to valuable intelligence.
c. Civil affairs units may assist in the acqui-

S~rroke ©1Perr©1~D©U'ils

a. An important characteristic of stability
operations is the extensive use of strike operations. These offensive operations include reconnaissance in force, raids, coordinated attacks,
and search and destroy and search and clear
operations. Strike operations are terminated by
withdrawal from the operational area upon
mission accomplishment; the holding of terrain is not emphasized.
b. Technical intelligence collection teams
coordinating with tactical units must emphasize
to such units that the destruction of potentially
valuable technical equipment/materiel and facilities should, when possible, be avoided during strike operations. Technical intelligence
personnel must continually brief tactical elements on current items wanted lists and other
items of significant intelligence interest. Proper
planning, implementation, and dissemination
of the operations order can minimize the loss
of potential intelligence in all aspects of stability operations.
~-] '.:l?.
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a. The long-range reconnaissance patrol
(LRRP) company has a limited capability to
acquire and exfiltrate small portable items of
enemy equipment or materiel. Technical intelligence requirements, however, should not interfere with primary patrol missions.
b. LRRP companies of the corps or their
equivalent command structure will have an extensive use for technical intelligence. Special
technical reports and data should be furnished
AGO 6869A
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for special missions. The nature of the LRRP
mission may necessitate observation, identification, and reporting of enemy equipment and
materiel over a period of 3 to 5 days. Such missions require as background the most current
technical information and data. Prior to dispatch of the LRRP on certain special missions,
technical intelligence personnel may be requested to provide a general technical briefing
on foreign equipment and materiel that will facilitate accurate identification of enemy equipment and materiel which may be observed or
used by the enemy to detect such patrols.

8-13. Psychological Operations
a. Psychological operations are widely used

•

•

in an insurgency environment. The discovery
of insurgent propaganda equipment requires
analysis by a functional team consisting of
supply, chemical, and equipment personnel to
analyze the printing presses, chemicals, inks,
and paper being used. Such analysis is necessary to assess guerrilla methods and determine
sources of supply. Communications-electronics
specialists can assist psychological operations
personnel in the analysis of loudspeakers and
radio broadcasting equipment.
b. The technical intelligence aspects of operable foreign radio and television stations and
printing facilities are important in furthering
the field army psychological operations capability. Such installations and facilities should
be turned over to civil affairs, psychological
operations units, and communications-electronic specialists for maximum exploitation.
c. Radio broadcasting and printing facilities
can be used to further enhance the overall
technical intelligence effort. Specific items of
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equipment desired can be advertised with an
offer of monetary reward to potential defectees.

8-14. Boobytraps and Mines
a. Explosive mines and boobytraps are used
widely by the insurgent for harassment of military operations. It is essential that technical
intelligence specialists keep abreast of these
munitions developments. The employment of
explosive ordnance materiel must be analyzed
on a continuous basis. For example, duds can
easily be modified and used as boobytraps.
b. The weapons and munitions specialists, in
coordination with EOD personnel, can provide
the following principal information when such
weapons and tactics are used :
( 1) Fragmentation radii.
(2) Modifications to boobytraps and
mines.
(3) Construction of locally manufactured
mines.
(4) Principal fuzing systems (pressure,
pull, chemical).
(5) Types of munitions (bomb, grenade,
artillery, mortar) .
(6) Fuze ingredients and structures.
(7) Modifications to fuzes.
(8) The use of "commercial devices" or
materiel.
(9) Foreign manufactured items used in
mines and boobytraps.
(10) Use of triggering devices (battery or
blasting machines).
(11) Use of chemical devices.
(12) Use of large bombs.
c. Dissemination of technical intelligence
concerning boobytraps and mines should include countermeasures training data.

8-5
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APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

A-1-. ARMY REGULATIONS
(C) 10-122
75-14
75-15
190-60
310-31
320-50
380-series
381-9
755-26

U.S. Army Security Agency (U).
Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
Respom;ibilities and Procedure:-; for Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
Physical Security Standards for Nuclear Weapons.
Organization and Equipment Authorization Tables of Organization and
Equipment.
Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
Military Security.
Army Scientific and Technical Intelligence.
Captured Enemy Equipment and Other Foreign Materiel.

A-2. ARMY SUBJECT SCHEDULES
30-46

•

Technical Intelligence Personnel.

A-3. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLETS
310-3
310-4

Military Publications Index of Doctrinal Training, and Organizational
Publications.
Index of Technical Manuals, Technical Bulletins, Supply Manuals, Supply
Bulletins, and Lubrication Orders.

A-4. FIELD MANUALS
3-1 (Test)
5-25
5-30
5-31
8-10
9-6
9-15

19-1
19-4
19-40
29-22
29-30

•

30-5
30-9
30-10
30-15
31-23

Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Combat Service Support,
TASTA-70.
Explosives and Demolitions.
Engineer Intelligence.
Boobytraps.
Medical, S~rvice Theater of Operations.
Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Operations.
Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades.
Military Police Support, Theater of Operations (when published).
Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
Maintenance Battalion and Company Operations (Nondivisional).
Maintenance Battalion and Company Operations in Divisions and Separate
Brigades.
Combat Intelligence.
Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army.
Terrain Intelligence.
Intelligence Interrogation.
Stability Operations-U.S. Army Doctrine.
A-1
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100-5
100-10
(C) 100-20

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service.
Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U).
USASA in Support of a Field Army (U).
Psychological Operations-U.S. Army Doctrine.
Psychological Operations-Techniques and Procedures.
Civil Affairs Operations.
Transportation Intelligence.
Operations of Army Forces in the Field.
Combat Service Support.
Field Service Regulations-Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)

101-5

Staff Officers' Field Manual; Staff Organization and Procedures.

31-45
(C) 32-5

(S) 32-10
33-1
33-5
41-10
55--8

•

(U).

A-5. TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT
TOE 30-18
Military Intelligence Detachment; Corps.
TOE 30-25
Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army.
TOE 30-34
Military Intelligence Company, Technical Intelligence.
TOE 30-600
Military Intelligence Organi:tation.
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APPENDIX B
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

•

•

Major categories of technical intelligence interest used for planning purposes include :
1. Science and Technology
a. Medical sciences.
b. Physical sciences.
c. Chemical sciences.
d. Research and development.
e. Materials.
/, Military equipment production.
g. Missiles and rockets.
2. Nuclear
a. Nuclear materials.
b. Weapons and munitions.
c. Nuclear reactors.
d. Nuclear power systems.
e. Nuclear propulsion .
3. Communications and Electronics
a. Radio.
b. Telephone equipment.
c. Carrier equipment.
d. Facsimile equipment.
e. Radar.
f. Computers.
g. Reconnaissance and surveillance equipment.
h. Electronic countermeasures.
i. Laser.
j. Telemetry.
k. Other.
4. Chemical and Biological (CB)
a. CB agents.
b. Weapons and munitions.
c. CB defensive equipment.
(1) Individual and collective protection
equipment.
(2) Detection and identification devices.
(3) Alarms and warning devices.
( 4) Decontamination equipment.
(5) Equipment for prophylaxis and
therapy.
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5. Ground Combat Systems
a. 'combat vehicles (wheeled and track).
b. Support/logistical vehicles.
c. Artillery.
d. Air defense equipment.
e. Infantry weapons.
f. Ammunition, munitions, fuzes.
g. Antitank equipment.
h. ~ndividual equipment and/or supplies.
i. Special warfare weapons.
j. Maintenance equipment.
k. Amphibious equipment.
l. Camouflage equipment.
m. Fire support equipment.
n. Airborne equipment.
o. Target acquisition equipment.
p. Construction equipment.
q. Mine warfare equipment.
r. Bridging.
s. Psychological warfare equipment.
6. Aerodynamic Systems.
a. Bombers.
b. Fighters.
c. Drones.
d. Helicopters.
e. Reconnaissance aircraft.
f. Other.
7. Missiles.
a. Aircraft-launched missiles.
b. Ground-to-ground missiles.
( 1) Short-range missiles.
(2) Intermediate range missiles.
(3) Long-range missiles.
c. Air defense missiles.
d. Anti-tank missiles.
e. Anti-missile missiles.
I. Space systems.
g. Submarine/ship-launched missiles.
8. Sensor Equipment
a. Optical.
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b. Acoustic.
c. Radar.
d. Photographic.
e. Electronics, to include telemetry.
f. Infrared.
g. Other.
9. Information Storage and Retrieval.
a. Electronic data processing equipment.
b. Document processing equipment.
c. Manual equipment.
d. Machine translation equipment.

e. Real-time ADP equipment.

f. Telemetry support equipment.
Graphic display equipment.
10. Logistics
a. Transportation nets, air, rail, water,
motor, pipeline.
b. Transport and terminal operations
equipment.
c. Terminal facilities, to include beaches.
d. Cargo container systems.
g.
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APPENDIX C
EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN

•
Copy No.
Thirtieth Army
HEIMERSHEIN, (595120) Germany
100930 July 19_
Appendix ____ to Annex ____ (Intelligence) to Operation Order.
1. General
a. References.
b. Purpose and scope.
c. Period covered.
d. Subordinate elements required to support similar plans.
e. Priorities.
2. Organization
a. Intelligence Agencies (at each echelon).
(1) Organization.
(2) Functions .
(3) Subordinate agencies functions.
( 4) Supporting agencies.
(5) Liaison and coordination.
b. A subparagraph for each functional area of technical intelligence
as it relates to paragraph 2c.
(1) Weapons-munitions.
(2) Communication-electronics.
(3) Supply and equipment.
( 4) Chemical.
( 5) Mobility.
( 6) Medical.
c. Each technical intelligence team should know the following:
(1) Mission.
(2) General organization.
(3) Functional team structure.
( 4) Allotment of technical intelligence personnel.
(5) Specific functions and responsibilities.
(6) Location of collecting points at each echelon.
(7) Availability of chemical and medical laboratories in the
theater.
3. Personnel
a. Military policies concerning:
(1) Responsibilities of capturing unit.
(2) Handling captured enemy materiel.

•

•
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(3) Handling abandoned equipment.
( 4) Handling technical facilities and installations.
(5) Authority for destruction of captured materiel when necessary.
( 6) Taking custody of enemy materiel from capturing units.
(7) Technical intelligence collection team operations in forward
area.
(8) Preliminary examinations and analysis.
(9) Reports to be rendered.
(a) To tactical units.
( b) To technical intelligence company.
(10) Coordination and liaison with combat intelligence personnel.
( 11) Equipment evacuation.
(12) Markings and tags.
b. Civilian
(1) Policies concerning civilians in an area of military operations
having a technical knowledge.
(2) Limitations on activities of individuals and groups.
(3) Policies concerning evacuation of civilian personnel.
( 4) Interrogation of civilians having a technical knowledge.
4. Direction
a. Important policies governing overall technical intelligence collection and analysis (trophies, souvenirs, theater policies).
b. Amplification of items wanted lists.
c. Special technical intelligence targets.
d. Policies governing publishing requirements.
e. Support to be provided by the field army and its subordinate
support elements (i.e. F ASCOM, general and direct support elements).
f. Additional support requirements necessary and by whom rendered.
g. Preparing EEi and other intelligence requirements.
h. Host country agreement (if applicable).
5. Collections
a. Documents
( 1) Procedures for collecting technical documents.
(2) Forwarding and handling of technical documents.
(3) Responsibilities for translation of technical documents.
(4) Responsibilities for analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of
technical data.
(5) Handling of timely technical data.
(6) Channels for forwarding.
b. Prisoners
(1) Procedures for selecting personnel with technical knowledge.
(2) Responsibilities of interrogator personnel.
(3) Technical intelligence cooperation with interrogators and
other combat intelligence personnel.
( 4) Handling of military personnel with technical knowledge.
(5) Handling of civilian personnel with technical knowledge.
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(6) Channels for evacuation.
(7) Ultimate disposition (civilians, defectees).
(8) Reports to be rendered.
c. Materiel
( 1) Specific unit responsibilities.
(2) Examination policies.
(3) Evacuation channels.
(a) Primary.
(b) Alternate.
(4) Destruction policies (authority to determine whether a target
should be destroyed).
(5) Policies in regard to significant new equipment.
(6) Sensitive or classified equipment.
(7) Safeguarding.
(8) Marking.
(9) Ultimate disposition.
d. Facilities and Installations.
( 1) Procedures for collecting, analyzing, and reporting information.
(2) Areas of primary overall intelligence and technical intelligence interest.
(3) Channels for forwarding facilities data.
(4) Disposition and dissemination of facilities data.
6. Processing
a. Records and/or files required to be maintained.
b. General policies governing preparation of technical reports.
(1) Preliminary reports (PRETECHREPS).
(2) Detailed technical reports (DETECHREPS).
c. Liaison and coordination between personnel of the technical intelligence company and other intelligence elements concerning
evaluation and interpretation of technical information.

"

•

7. Dissemination
a. Scope.
b. Content.
c. Editorial assistance.
d. Types of reports.
e. Special reports.
f. Policies governing dissemination.

•

8. Functional and Task Force Operations
a. Theater and/or theater army policies.
b. Scope and priorities.
c. Effort that may be expended on missions.
d. Additional support sources if needed.
e. Procedures for collecting and reporting data.
f. Responsibilities for direction of operations.
g. Limitations on units and individuals.
h. Security.
(CLASSIFICATION)
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i. Safeguarding components of intelligence value.
j. Host country agreement.
JONES
General
Distribution: C
OFFICIAL
/2/S.S. SMITH
Smith
G2
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APPENDIX D
COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL REPORTS (COMTECHREP)
(STANAG 2084)

•

•

1. COMTECHREP-TYPE A
To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following
initial examination of enemy aircraft. (To be completed to the extent
possible by Army technical intelligence personnel in event that Air
Force technical intelligence personnel are not available.)
A. Date and location of crash and map of reference.
B. Type of aircraft and:
( 1) Overall length.
(2) Overall wing-span.
C. Identification and distinguishing marks.
D. Type of engine (s) and condition.
E. Cause of crash; number, location and caliber of projectile strikes;
condition of aircraft.
F. Armament:
( 1) Guns of all types, installation positions, quantity.
(2) Ammunition and number of magazines .
(3) Bombs and bomb installations.
(4) Mines and mine carriers.
(5) Rocket projectiles and carriers.
(6) Pyi:9technics, number and type.
G. Armor 'plate; quantity, positions, thickness, strikes, penetrations.
H. Number of crew and fate.
I. Wings and control surfaces, leading edge protection against balloon
cables by cutters, strengthening or other special devices; de-icing.
J. State if samples are obtainable of:
( 1) Gasoline.
(2) Oil.
( 3) Coolant.
(4) Hydraulic .fluids.
(5) De-icing fluids.
K.

•

Internal equipment; state condition and whether bombsights,
radio, photographic equipment and electronics equipment and
instruments are standard. If not, specify modifications, alternations or omissions. Obtain radio frequency setting, if possible.
L. Landing gear: type and condition.
M. General remarks and special points or unusual features not mentioned.
N. Name plates photographed:
(1) Airframe.
(2) Engine.
(3) Others .
D-1
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P.

Other information.
Name of individual in charge of technical intelligence team making
examination.
Q. Time and origin of message.
2. COMTECHREP-TYPE B
Used for reporting information about ammunition, missiles, bombs,
shells, rockets, projectiles, mines, torpedoes, etc., and submitted by the
fastest available means immediately following initial examination. Only
those headings for which information is available are reported.
A. Nationality, designation and mark number.
B. Description. (Type and category, i.e., tactical missile--cruise).
C. Overall length of missile, including fuze, tail, vanes, and fittings.
D. Maximum diameter of missiles/munitions.
E. Shape and design of missiles/munitions (streamlining shells).
F. Length and width of tail.
G. Span of vanes.
H. Thickness of casing at nose.
I. Thickness of casing at sides.
J. Thickness of casing at base.
K. Material of body.
L. Material of tail or vanes.
M. Color and marking of nose.
N. Color and marking of body.
0. Color and marking of tail or vanes.
P. Weight and nature of main filling.
Q. Total weight of missile/munition.
R. Method of suspension.
S. Warhead weight, type, and detonation method.
T. Fusing systems and markings.
U. Anti-handling of boobytrap devices.
V. Method of propulsion.
W. Date and location of missile/munition.
X. Other information.
Y. Name of individual in charge of the technical intelligence team
making examination.
Z. Time and origin of message.
3. COMTECHREP-TYPE C
To be submitted within 72 hours following the acquisition of an item of
captured equipment not covered under Types A and B.
A. Date found, location (map reference).
B. Type of equipment and quantity.
C. Origin.
D. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details).
E. Conditions of equipment.
F. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (additional
details).
G. Recommended disposal.
H. Name plates photographed.
I. Photographs taken.
J. Other information.
K. Name of chief of team.
L. Time and origin of message.
D-2
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APPENDIX E
TITLES OF GROUPS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
(Annex "A" (D of A) to STANAG 2097)

0

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN-

•

Type of Equipment

Items in Title

Examples

Small Arms
Infantry antiaircraft (AA) Weapons
Infantry antitank (AT) Weapons

Caliber
Description
Sighting year

7.62mm Pistol M 1964
12.7mm AA Machinegun M 7963
82mm AT Launcher M 1964

Hand Grenades

If antitank (AT)
Sighting year

Hand Grenades M 1964
AT Hand Grenades M 1964

Artillery

Caliber
Description
If Self-propelled (SP)
Sighting year

lOOmm Field Gun M 1964
152mm SP Gun M 1965

Rocket Launchers

Caliber
Description
Number of rounds
Sighting year

240mm Rocket Launcher ( 16-round)
M 1964
One Round Rocket Launcher M 1964

Weight class

Medium Tank M 1964
Light Amphibious Tank M 1964

Tanks

If amphibious

Sighting year
Armored Personnel Carriers

If amphibious
If tracked or half-tracked

APC M 1964
Amphibious Tracked APC M 1964

Sighting year
Assault Guns (SU's)

Description
Caliber (without mm)
Sighting year

SU-100 M 1964

Soft Skinned Vehicles including
wheeled amphibians

If amphibious
If tracked

Truck, 4x2 M 1964
Amphibious Truck, 4x4 M 1965
Tracked Amphibian M 1964

Description
Type of drive (wheels)
Sighting year

•

Engineer Equipment

Description
Sighting year

Trencher M 1964
Pontoon M 1964

Radars

Description and Type
Sighting year

Tactical Control SAM Radar M 1964
Surveillance Field Radar M 1964
Fire Control Antiaircraft Radar M
1964

Missiles

Role
Sighting year

SSM 1964
SAM 1964
(Use STANAG 3236 when applicable)
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6-1
Collection ____________________ . _ 5-1,5-2
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Definition _______________ .
List __________ . _. ___ . _. _ .
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3-3a, b
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Corps technical intelligence
collection team _ . _ .. _ . _...... __ . 5-6
Counterintelligence _. ___ . _. _. ____ 5-5

Army Materiel Command (AMC)_ See USAMC
Army Security Agency (ASA)
See USASA
Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence (ACSI)
Functions and responsibilities 1-7a

Chemical, biological, and radiological ( CBR) technical
intelligence
Capabilities _______________ _
Objectives ____________ .. ____ _
Chief of engineers-------------Civil affairs units
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Insurgent warfare-------·----·_ 8-1
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Radiological ( CBR) ____ .. - _ll-12, 1ll
Communication-electronics .. _ 3-2, 3

0-4

5-4
6-:
1-3

3-4
3-4

3-4
8-1
7-2
3-7,3-8
3-1,3-2
1-1

FM

3~16

Paragraph

Page

1-3a,
1-1
1-3b(l)
3-4
General supply and equipment 3-6,7
Medical _________ - ____ - - __ - - 3-10, 11
3-6
Mobility __________________ _ 3-8, 9
3-5
Scientific and Technical
(S&T) _____ - - ___________ _ 1-4a
1-2
Strategic technical _________ _ 1-5a, 1-8 1-2, 1-3
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